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Despite increasing studies of IT monitoring, our understanding of how IT-mediates relations between the 
watcher and watched remains limited in two areas. First, either traditional actor-centric frameworks 
assuming pre-defined watcher-watched relationships (e.g., panopticon or synopticon) are adopted or 
monitoring actors are removed to focus on data flows (e.g., dataveillance, assemblages, panspectron). 
Second, IT monitoring research predominantly assumes IT artifacts to be stable, bounded, designed 
objects, with prescribed uses which provides an oversimplified view of actor relationships. To redress 
these limitations, a conceptual framework of veillance applicable to a variety of possible IT or non-IT-
mediated relationships between watcher and watched is developed. Using the framework, we conduct a 
conceptual review of the literature, identifying IT-enabled monitoring and transformations of actors, 
goals, mechanisms and foci and develop an action net model of IT veillance where IT artifacts are 
theorized as equivocal, distributable and open for diverse use, open to edits and contributions by 
unbounded sets of heterogenous actors characterized by diverse goals and capabilities. The action net of 
IT veillance is defined as a flexible decentralized interconnected web shaped by multidirectional watcher-
watched relationships, enabling multiple dynamic goals and foci. Cumulative contributions by 
heterogenous participants organize and manipulate the net, having an impact through influencing 
dispositions, visibilities and the inclusion/exclusion of self and others. The model makes three important 
theoretical contributions to our understanding of IT monitoring of watchers and watched and their 
relationships. We discuss implications and avenues for future studies on IT veillance. 
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Advances in computing technologies, especially in the capture and manipulation of large quantities of 
data, have led to a rise in digital monitoring on a scale impossible just a decade earlier (e.g., Astor et al. 
2013; Newell and Marabelli 2015). Digital monitoring involves heterogenous participants engaging in 
diverse alliances and conflict that are able to challenge previously exclusive rights of watchers1 to 
manipulate visibility and anonymity (Anteby and Chan 2018; Scott and Orlikowski 2014). During the 
2020 COVID-19 pandemic, for example, contact tracing of citizens in various countries differed in 
significant ways, co-shaped by complex interactions among government, tech companies, citizens, 
businesses and privacy advocates (Busvine and Rinke 2020; Haskins 2020; Servick 2020). Norway’s data 
protection regulators vetoed distribution of the health authority’s contact-tracing app that used location 
data and processed proximity data centrally rather than on individual smartphones (Browne 2020) while, 
conversely, Taiwan and South Korea relied on individual smartphones and peer reporting for centralized 
collection of data as well as intensive cooperation between the government, private health providers, and 
hacking communities (McCurry 2020; Silva 2020). Traditional conceptions of monitoring (e.g., Orwell’s 
“Big Brother”) project a sinister image of malevolent watchers, while these monitoring practices are 
premised on possibilities that may benefit the targets of monitoring.   
Much recent work employs a frame popularized by Foucault’s (1977) focus on Jeremy Bentham’s 
sponsorship of a panoptical architectural device to maximize the visibility of those being surveyed while 
minimizing the visibility of its practice, situated in a watchtower. Foucault argued that panoptic 
observation trains those under surveillance to conduct themselves as if they are being watched even while 
they may not be. Knowing that one and one’s fellows are potentially under surveillance induces their 
conformance with surveillance precepts. The panopticon model’s popular influence on the 
monitoring/surveillance literature brought to the fore how disciplinary power operates through the few 
watching over the many (Haggerty 2006). Gaps remain, however; researchers focused largely on the 
 
1 Formal definitions of watchers, watched, and other monitoring terms are provided in Table 1.   
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disciplinary relationships between the watcher and watched and ignored attributes of contemporary 
monitoring practices not neatly fitting the panoptic frame (Haggerty 2006; Lyon 2007). Contemporary 
monitoring requires different framing (e.g., Haggerty 2006; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte et al. 2014; Mann 
and Ferenbok 2013; Zuboff 2015; 2016). While some recent work on IT monitoring either extends the 
panoptical model while still focusing on actors (e.g. portable-, post-, and super-panopticon, synopticon) 
(e.g., De Saulles and Horner 2011; Lyon 2006); others remove actors from central focus by developing 
models based on data flows (e.g., dataveillance, assemblages, panspectron) (e.g., DeLanda 1991; 
Haggerty 2006). New gaps emerge in consequence, premised on the assumption that IT artifacts 
mediating monitoring between watchers and watched are stable, bounded and designed objects. Recent 
studies in the Management Organization Studies (MOS) and Information Systems (IS) fields challenge 
these assumptions, exploring IT artifacts as fundamentally editable, re-programmable and open for 
contributions from potentially unbounded heterogenous participants (Garud et al. 2008; Kallinikos et al. 
2010; Manovich 2001; Yoo et al. 2010). For instance, the design and functioning of Covid-19 tracing 
apps can be (re)designed and (re)negotiated by diverse participants (Singer 2020). These newer 
perspectives on IT artifacts change our knowledge about relationships between watcher and watched and 
their possible implications for predictable social order and control2 on which theorizing of non-IT 
monitoring has traditionally relied (Clegg et al. 2006). A veillance concept and a synthesizing veillance 
framework applicable to a variety of IT or non-IT-mediated relationships between watchers and watched 
is proposed as a means of addressing these gaps in the literature.  
We offer three important theoretical contributions. We do so by developing an action net model 
of IT veillance as a flexible, decentralized and interconnected web shaped by watcher-watched 
relationships that are multidirectional, enabling multiple dynamic goals and foci to be affected by 
cumulative contributions of heterogenous participants organizing, manipulating and having an impact on 
 
2We conceptualise organizational control as attempts to align individual behaviors with organizational objectives 
“based on monitoring and evaluation of behavior and outputs” (Ouchi, 1977, p. 95); thus, incorporating a broader set 
of organizational practices compared to monitoring. 
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the net, influencing dispositions of roles, visibilities and inclusion/exclusion of others and self. First, our 
action net captures IT-enabled flexibility, complexity, unpredictability and constant evolution of 
heterogenous actors and their relationships, addressing transformative IT impacts on monitoring (e.g., 
Leclercq-Vandelannoitte et al. 2014; Mann and Ferenbok 2013; Zuboff 2016). Second, the action net is 
built on neither particular pre-defined patterns of actor relationship as watcher/watched nor on prior 
organizational boundaries (Czarniawska 2004). Participant relationships and IT enactments performative 
to actor roles, flexible system elements and boundaries, enabling multiple dynamic foci, continuously re-
establish these relations. Third, our findings reveal four new relational logics between the watcher and 
watched in contemporary IT veillance systems. These relational logics are constituted by i) flexibility of 
veillance elements; ii) diffused actor roles; iii) cumulative extended manipulations and iv), emergent non-
linear actor relationships. IT monitoring aligned with IT artifacts as equivocal, distributed and open for 
uses, edits, and contributions of unbounded sets of heterogenous actors with diverse logics and goals 
ground these relational logics.  
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review monitoring terms, discuss their applicability 
in IT-mediated contexts and develop a veillance framework to theorize what factors and concepts 
characterize the relationships between the watcher and the watched in IT and non-IT monitoring. Second, 
the literature review is elaborated and the framework explained. Third, the findings, highlighting key 
transformations enabled by IT to actors, goals, mechanisms and foci of monitoring, are elaborated. 
Fourth, the theoretical contributions are presented, including the proposed action net model of monitoring, 
and the new logics of IT veillance systems. We also present avenues for future research. 
2. Conceptual Review and Veillance Web Framework  
2.1 Monitoring Concepts 
Most monitoring terms and frameworks conceptually emphasize one or the other of the watcher, the 
watched, or monitoring as a scrutinized sets of data flows (see Table 1). We discuss these concepts in 
turn, as they apply to the watcher, watched or act of watching.  
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
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The relationship implied between the watcher and the watched, from the watchers’ perspective, is 
either top-down or bottom-up, conceptualized as surveillance or sousveillance. Surveillance is the most 
widely used approach, associated with centralized control (Foucault 1977) predicated on IT monitoring 
(Boyne 2000; Iedema and Rhodes 2010). Sousveillance, in which watchers are decentralized and flexible 
actors (Baudrillard 2006; Bogard 1996; Zuboff 2015), was originally proposed to account for 
relationships in which those that are objects of surveillance use IT to observe their supervisors and peers, 
such as protestors filming police (Mann and Ferenbok 2013). Sousveillance, in the form of video 
recording of Mr. George Floyd’s death in 2020, sparked widespread civil unrest in the USA. 
Organizational members’ digital devices can capture or report actions of other members (Silverman 
2019). The leak of the U.K.’s National Security Council decision to allow Huawei to provide non-core 
parts of the UK’s 5G mobile network is a case in point (Loughran 2019).  
From the perspective of the watched, it is terms from the second meta-group (panopticon in its 
multiple variations and synopticon, in terms of the many watching the few) that define monitoring. 
Originally proposed by Bentham in 1843 as a design based on his brother Samuel’s innovations at a 
Moscow factory, panopticism was developed in parallel in a diverse range of institutions. Foucault (1977) 
popularized the term, to describe a disciplinary society that sought to control and normalize the conduct 
of the watched in contemporary organizations, giving rise to a transdisciplinary ‘surveillance theory’ 
(Brocklehurst 2001; Wood 2002). What the panopticon does not account for are diverse IT-enabled 
transformations (Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Marx 2002), including the agency and IT-enabled 
empowerment of the watched (Brocklehurst 2001; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte et al. 2014). Furthermore, it 
conceives of organizations as bounded, observable and calculable spaces rather than as IT-enabled 
flexible spaces with emergent and reciprocal interconnections between watchers and watched (Martin et 
al. 2009). Several extensions of the panopticon term include electronic, information, portable, post-, and 
super-panopticon (Table 1). Radical IT transformations make extensions of these metaphors contradictory 
and possibly irrelevant (Haggerty 2006).  
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IT monitoring is increasingly discussed as emphasizing data flows more than those actors 
associated with them. Thus, dataveillance builds on employees and customers’ digital data traces to 
access, interpret and monitor behaviors (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013; Van Dijck 2014). In 
surveillance assemblages “there is no central force … no Big Brother, no panopticon, but a shifting, 
moving observation, presentation, and regulation of the self by countless measures in countless locations 
(Gilliom and Monahan 2012, p. 22). Data collection flows exist prior to any particular assemblage’s 
fixing of them temporarily and spatially, emergently and unstably through unique IT capturing of flow 
(Haggerty and Ericson 2000). Likewise, DeLanda (1991)’s panspectron focuses on new, previously 
unavailable, zones for monitoring enabled by decentralized, pervasive, often invisible or difficult to detect 
digital networks made up of sensors, satellites, digital antennae and cable-traffic intercepts (DeLanda 
1991, p. 2006). Similar to assemblages, the panspectron focuses only on IT-enabled monitoring, often 
ignoring co-existing systems of non-IT and/or top-down monitoring; for instance, it could not grasp the 
complexities of contact tracing of citizens within a community.  
Two fundamental problems are highlighted by conceptually overviewing monitoring terms and 
associated frameworks. First, none either serve as a foundation for a comparative systematic analysis of 
transformations enabled by IT or offer mutually excluding models describing IT-mediated watcher-
watched relationships. Some rely on extensions to traditional actor-centric terms (e.g. portable-, post-, and 
super-panopticon, synopticon) (e.g., De Saulles and Horner 2011; Poster 1996), while others develop 
models of data flows specific and exceptional for IT contexts (e.g., dataveillance, assemblages, 
panspectron) (e.g., DeLanda 1991). Second, despite substantial differences, these studies assume IT tools 
are stable objects. Recent studies question such assumptions with regard to IT artifacts. Table 2 shows 
diverse IT characteristics, definitions and sample studies calling for re-thinking fundamental assumptions 
and explanations of IT processes and outcomes (e.g., Nambisan et al. 2017; Zittrain 2008). 
--- Insert Table 2 here ---  
As the table illustrates, IT artifacts are increasingly seen as possessing unique characteristics of 
being editable and re-programmable during the process of IT use (Kallinikos et al. 2010; Manovich 2001; 
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Yoo et al. 2010), What is enabled are potentially unbounded and heterogenous participant contributions 
guided by multiple logics of organizing (Lyytinen et al. 2016; Majchrzak and Malhotra 2013). Emerging 
knowledge about IT artifacts has yet to be incorporated into theorizing the roles of the watcher, the 
watched and the act of watching in the digital age. To address this, we propose a new conceptual veillance 
framework to guide analysis of IT-enabled monitoring.   
2.2 Veillance Framework  
A framework for analyzing contemporary monitoring should be simple but flexible enough to incorporate 
diverse and oftentimes complex and evolving relationships. Our proposed conceptual framework has 
three major elements: the veillance concept (VC), a typology of veillance foci (VF) and a Veillance Web 
(VW) framework. Together, these elements help guide, structure and bound our analyses and theorization 
of what factors of the phenomenon change, how and why (Whetten 1989).  
2.2.1. Veillance Concept 
We propose the concept of veillance (based on the French verb veiller, meaning to watch) as an 
elementary operation common to various monitoring practices, whether non-IT or IT-mediated. Building 
on Lyon’s (2006) work, we define veillance as the social operation making a phenomenon visible. The 
focus is on what is made visible and how, emphasizing processual and practical aspects relating to a range 
of actors and relationships. The proposed concept is sufficiently universal in terms of Ockham’s razor3 to 
incorporate both IT and non-IT monitoring and avoids pre-defined a priori relationships between the 
watcher and the watched (as sur- and sous-veillance do) as well as predefined subjects of monitoring (as 
panoptical or synoptical approaches do).  
2.2.2. Typology of Veillance Foci (VF) 
The focus of veillance, that which is made visible and traceable, recognizes the diversity and evolution of 
monitoring practices. Clegg et al. (2006) discuss how organizational monitoring changed in focus from 
the body, to soul, to commitment, to productive resistance. We build on this classification by proposing 
 
3 A principle attributed to William of Occam that in explaining something one should make no more assumptions than are necessary. 
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three foci of veillance: body, soul, and commitment. We do not include Clegg et al.’s fourth political 
regime, power as productive resistance, because it can take place across each of the veillance types in the 
form of sous and peer-veillance when those being watched also constitute perceptions of the body, soul 
and commitment of their watchers (Kenny 2019; Sewell 1998)4. Table A1 in Appendix A provides 
examples of the VF typology for non-IT and IT veillance.  
Veillance of body (VoB). Veillance of body is the social operation making the bodies and 
behaviors of the watched visible. It is practiced, for example, when organizations associate their 
efficiency with physical control over the bodies of the watched and induce desirable behavior from them. 
Historically, VoB was used for particular institutionalized groups, such as soldiers, prisoners, or people 
with socially contagious diseases (Clegg et al. 2006; Foucault 2003). A shift in the paradigm of 
organizational monitoring was introduced with Scientific Management that justified the scrutiny of 
“productive hands” (Clegg et al. 2006), surveying employees’ bodies and behaviors using simple 
productivity metrics. While the approach became standard for work design, it also proved to be associated 
with high fatigue, turnover, and absenteeism (Yates 1993). The body as an object of political economy is 
extended by IT tools enabling biometric identification, monitoring of bio-health markers such as blood 
pressure and heart rate, as well as CCTV operation. Such digital devices enable the body to be 
increasingly subject to self-surveillance as well as that of corporate training programs and the peer 
surveillance of other team members. 
Veillance of soul (VoS). Th social operation of veillance of the soul makes the moral life of those 
watched visible and knowable. Organizations practicing VoS seek to become knowledgeable about the 
 
4 For example, power as productive resistance to veillance of body may be digitally constituted by counter-veillance that marks the subject as 
deviant. For example, resistance to normative femininity in terms of biometric normalization has been studied by focusing on ‘fatshionistas’ 
resisting subjectification to the biopower of fashion by embracing a lack of body discipline as a positive that they digitally project in videos and 
blogs (Harju and Huovinen, 2015). Resistance to veillance of soul, such as resisting mandatory online courses (e.g., ‘Health and Safety’), is 
difficult but not impossible. These programs are oriented to the moral demeanour of the soul; they entail correctly identifying policy approved 
options in online quizzes. No discretion is allowed; answers are only right or wrong. To resist such programs, a case may be made on ethical 
grounds of conscientious objection to the intrusiveness of some of the questions dealing with issues of sexuality, for instance, if one does not 
mind being noted as deviant. Resistance to commitment is another way of being noted as deviant. Non-compliant commitment to organizational 
culture is a mark of being a whistle-blower with notable effects within organizational interaction orders, local group cultures and institutional 




motivations of employees and their informal work lives and attitudes (Trahair 2001). VoS is practiced 
when organizations demand to know the contexts framing the social and emotional souls of employees, as 
in Ford’s Sociological Department5 (Clegg et al. 2006) or when managers built on Mayo (1975)’s 
interpretation of the perplexing results from the Hawthorne experiments to turn the focus of their 
veillance of bodies to that of their interior life, dispositions and how these frame the informal work 
relations of the watched (Mayo 1975; Muldoon 2017). For the watched, transformations in veillance from 
VoB to VoS, moving from Taylorist to Human Relation thinking in management, might appear to offer 
minimal supervision, often taking the form of a “friendly chat” (Clegg et al. 2006, p.81). However, as 
Mayo writes: “Their opinion is, of course, mistaken: in a sense they are getting closer supervision that 
ever before, the change is in the quality of the supervision” (Mayo 1975, p.75). In this sense, VoS 
encompasses VoB while also stressing interpretations of consciousness and unconsciousness (Mayo 
1975) as a priority (Clegg et al. 2006). Examples of IT-mediated VoS include company monitoring of 
employees’ social media posts and the blogosphere. In the evaluation of performativity in UK and 
Australian universities, for example, social media displays by academics are taken as representational 
devices to be monitored for tallying signs of media appearances.  
Veillance of commitment (VoC). Veillance of commitment strives to make visible the 
commitment of those watched in non-standardized situations, such as creative tasks, independent and 
spontaneous actions or activities with high complexity or communication requirements. Here control is 
sought through people freely expressing obeisance to a normative order, showing willing consent. 
Digitally performing HR tests devised to insure the organization against claims of sexual harassment, 
health and safety breaches and other sources of litigation would be examples. Organization members have 
to consent to do these periodic tests; consent and completion ensures that the organization is protected 
against any misdemeanors as it can be claimed that any deviance on the part of actors was a conscious 
 
5 An example comes from the Ford Sociological Department, which was one of the first and most striking extensions of VoB to VoS. To make 
sure only deserving workers received high wages (e.g., the famous “five-dollar a day), the Department collected information on workers from 
the government, churches, civic organizations, banks, as well as regularly visiting workers’ homes to ensure compliance with company 
standards for better morals, sanitary conditions, and “habits of thrift and saving” (Clegg et al. 2006a; Meyer 1981). 
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violation of the digital protocols in play in membership tests that had been consented to and completed. In 
universities, using digital devices such as Publons for publicizing peer review for journals offers a more 
voluntarist but still normatively framing examples. Other examples include peer monitoring in virtual 
teams and norms of continuous online accessibility and responsiveness, accelerated by the new 
homeworking work practices established during the coronavirus pandemic. VoC implies a substantial 
internalization of (or at least high sensitivity towards) the watcher’s goals and values (Levay and Waks 
2009; Rhodes 2007) and focuses on the subject’s commitment being realized as a part of team and peer 
scrutiny and (digital) self-monitoring.    
2.2.3. Veillance Web (VW) Framework 
Following our review and analysis of diverse monitoring concepts we identified several key factors that 
characterize the relationships between the watcher and the watched in both IT and non-IT veillance. 
Contemporary veillance, we propose, is best represented as an action net conceived as a web of 
complexly interconnected elements that relate veillance actors and goals, apparatuses and foci. Figure 1 
presents the conceptual VW framework.  
--- Insert Figure 1 here --- 
Veillance actors refer to who is involved in the veillance and builds on the core idea that 
veillance could include various watchers and watched (conceptualized as diversity of actors) in a variety 
of top-down, bottom-up and peer relationships (conceptualized as diversity of relationships). The 
veillance goals describe why veillance is being conducted (conceptualized as goal diversity).  The 
veillance apparatuses focuses on how veillance is conducted, by specifying various ways in which the 
watched are made visible to the watchers (conceptualized as veillance mechanisms). Finally, veillance 
foci describe what is the main attention of the veillance operation (i.e., body, soul, or commitment), 
drawn from the typology in Table A1. The VW provides a simple but highly flexible framework to 
capture various veillance systems and watcher-watched relationships across non-IT and IT contexts. We 
apply the VW framework to guide our analysis of literature on IT and non-IT monitoring to understand 
how and in what ways IT-mediation changes monitoring. As we explain below, the development of the 
12 
 
framework emerged interactively with the process of coding papers in the literature review. The results of 
our analyses were then used to theorize key IT-enabled transformations of monitoring,  
3.  Methodology 
We performed a review of literature in top eight MOS6 and IS7 journals using the VW framework as a 
basis for our analysis. While this approach does not result in a complete list of veillance articles, selecting 
these journals provides a representative sample of quality peer-reviewed veillance research. We used 
several keywords related to monitoring practices: surveillance, panopticon, monitoring, privacy and audit. 
To complement the articles in the leading journals, we also performed a search on the keyword 
‘surveillance’ in the Business Source EBSCO database. Finally, we conducted a citation analysis to 
ensure we identified highly cited articles to include in our discussion. In total, we identified 629 articles. 
Two rounds of screening were used to identify the final sample of 132 coded papers. A summary of the 
literature review and screening processes, counts per journal, the resulting sample and coding categories 
appears in Appendix B.  
3.1 Coding 
An iterative in-depth coding process coded empirical papers identified (e.g., Bélanger et al. 2014; Shapira 
2011), a process involving initially reading several articles, identifying initial codes, grouping codes into 
categories and re-coding articles as new categories emerged. The coding resulted in the development of 
key attributes of the elements of the VW framework. Attributes for veillance foci are veillance of body 
(VoB), commitment (VoC) and soul (VoS); diversity of actors include organizations, employees, 
customers, governments (i.e., governments, nations, states or agencies), and other people (students, 
citizens, etc.); attributes for diversity of relationships include patterns of interplay of roles of watchers 
(“W”) and watched (“w”); attributes for goal diversity are documentation, verification, 
prevention/protection, discovery, influence/persuasion, profit, provision of benefits, self-improvement 
and compliance; attributes for veillance mechanisms include hard and soft mechanisms. These refer to 
 
6Financial Times list of top 50 business journals, available at https://www.ft.com/content/3405a512-5cbb-11e1-8f1f-00144feabdc0. 
7 Eight leading IS journals in the Association for Information Systems Senior Scholars’ list (https://aisnet.org/?SeniorScholarBasket).  
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how veillance is conducted. For example, hard mechanisms could include coercion, physical markings, 
and inspections to generate fear; soft mechanism examples include seduction, deception, rewarding and 
internationalizing by the watched. Each category was examined across non-IT and IT veillance. The 
details of the coding process, categories and attributes are shown in Appendix B, while the resulting codes 
for the 132 papers are shown in Appendix C. 
3.2 Thematic Analysis 
Once papers were coded, we conducted a thematic analysis to identify how the elements of the VF are 
transformed by IT. As detailed in Figure A1 in Appendix A, we analyzed the coded papers across each 
element of the VF and its related categories and attributes of non-IT and IT veillance, which enabled us to 
develop detailed insights into how each VF element was transformed by IT. Notably, the analysis of IT 
transformations to veillance actors resulted in identification of two groups of the watcher-watched (Ww 
hereafter) relationship patterns: 1) shared patterns that were identical in terms of participating actors and 
their roles across both non-IT and IT veillance; and 2) distinctive patterns where actors and their Ww 
roles are distinctively explored either in non-IT or in IT settings. Examples of shared and distinctive 
patterns are presented in Table 4 in the next section. Comparative analysis of other VF elements (goals, 
mechanisms, and foci) across non-IT and IT veillance proceeded across the identified shared and 
distinctive patterns to identify detailed transformations enabled by IT mediation.   
4. Findings: IT-enabled Transformations to the Watcher-Watched Relationships 
The thematic analysis identified IT-enabled transformations to VW framework elements and their 
relationships. We discuss here the IT-enabled transformations while in section 5 we integrate these 
transformations into an ensemble and theorize how they affect the interplay of VF framework elements.  
4.1 Actor Relationships and Roles 
Our analysis identified that shared Ww patterns of actor relationships incorporated widely discussed 
patterns across non-IT and IT contexts of organizations watching employees (e.g., Bernstein 2012) and 
organizational peer veillance (Anderson et al. 2017; Poppo and Zhou 2014) (see Table 3). At the same 
time, an important distinctive pattern discussed only in non-IT veillance included relationships where 
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organizations and employees are both watchers and watched (e.g., Long et al. 2011; Riad 2005). Other 
distinctive patterns of IT veillance were multiple; for example, relationships where organizations and 
customers are both watchers and watched (e.g., Orlikowski and Scott 2014). As our analysis below 
illustrates, IT makes relationships between veillance actors more complex and intensive, with the roles of 
the watcher and watched more interactional, facilitating the incorporation of a greater variety of actors.  
--- Insert Table 3 here --- 
4.1.1. Increased Intensity and Complexity of Veillance. Our analysis reveals the increased 
intensity and complexity introduced by IT in Ww relationships across shared patterns. For example, IT 
veillance of employees leads to their increased performance (Grant and Higgins 1991; Pierce et al. 2015) 
and responsible behavior (Gozman and Currie 2014) but is also associated with increased resistance (Ball 
and Wilson 2000), stress (Ayyagari 2011) and disciplinary control (Brocklehurst 2001). Other studies 
discuss new areas in IT monitoring (e.g. AI, online spaces) (e.g., D’Arcy et al. 2009; Leclercq-
Vandelannoitte et al. 2014). Likewise, studies mention that IT enables or significantly intensifies 
previously unstudied peer organizational veillance, such as information sharing in healthcare (Anderson 
et al. 2017). Notably, organizations watching customers rely on IT-enabled new approaches to collecting 
and sharing customer data (e.g., Culnan 1993; Li and Qin 2017) as well new ways of acting on collected 
data such as smart metering technology to monitor electricity usage and control or disable consumers’ 
appliances (Karwatzki et al. 2017a; 2017b). Another shared pattern concerned transformations in work 
practices that IT veillance brings to traditional industries, such as healthcare (e.g., Doolin 2004; Staats et 
al. 2017; Stahl et al. 2012), universities (Alvarez 2008), trading and retailing (Marsden and Tung 1999; 
Wareham et al. 1998), transport (Shaw et al. 2000) and navy sites (Stanko and Beckman 2015). 
In terms of distinctive patterns, the analysis reveals a significantly higher variety of actors 
involved in IT veillance, with more complex and intense Ww relationships. For example, governments 
use IT to collect data and regulate market traders (Tung and Marsden 2000), monitor citizen tax activities 
(Williams 1996), online activism (Ameripour et al. 2010) and behaviors in special economic zones 
(Karanasios and Allen 2013). Other studies suggest that IT intensifies veillance by enabling multi-
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directional monitoring between buyers and sellers via online platforms (e.g., Dellarocas 2005; Kordzadeh 
and Warren 2017) and new IT-enabled tools and techniques of identifying, collecting and managing data 
(Clemons and Wilson 2015; Singh et al. 2011). Summarizing our analysis, we propose:  
Proposition 1. IT increases the complexity and intensity of monitoring. 
 
4.1.2. Increased Complexity of Ww Roles and Relationships. Our analysis reveals that IT 
stimulates more complex and distributed roles of watchers and watched compared to non-IT settings. 
Table 4 summarizes the number of papers with three or more actors, two or more watchers or watched, 
and the number of papers with actors who are both watchers and watched. In the table, distinctive patterns 
of IT veillance suggest complex roles of being watchers and watched compared to non-IT veillance. 
--- Insert Table 4 here --- 
The watchers in IT veillance are often complex and distributed, with several watchers observing 
the same watched or where the watcher can be also the watched. Patients’ data is collected by doctors that 
are monitored and regulated by governments (Rizq 2013). Complex and multiple roles of watchers tend to 
hold true for both veillance between organizations and employees (e.g. Mazmanian et al. 2013; Vance et 
al. 2015) and organizations and customers (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 2016; Dellarocas 2005; Kordzadeh 
and Warren 2017). For example, social media websites (e.g., TripAdvisor.com) enable complex Ww 
relationships: customers monitor and review hotels that monitor reviews by customers as well as reviews 
received by other hotels, while hotel accreditation services monitor and review hotels and customer 
feedback (Scott and Orlikowski 2014). Additional examples include the unintended disclosure of 
information or enhanced visibility of veillance actors to third parties via social networks (Kordzadeh and 
Warren 2017) or online communication (Zhang and Venkatesh 2013). Another trend is to study the 
government as (co)watcher regulating organizational collection of customer information via IT tools in a 
range of contexts including location-based services, healthcare IS, and market surveillance systems. (e.g., 
Adjerid et al. 2016Li et al. 2015). Contact tracing during the 2020 pandemic is an example of the 
government as (co)watcher. 
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In IT veillance, the watched, traditionally subjects of veillance, become (co)watchers. Examples 
include citizen online social media activism (e.g., Ameripour et al. 2010); citizens using state-installed 
video surveillance systems in public places to observe other citizens and organizations (Allen et al. 2007); 
customers using IT tools to monitor eBay traders (Dellarocas 2005) and healthcare practitioners using 
surveillance IT to self-present to peers and clients (Visser et al. 2018).  Hence, based on our analysis, we 
propose:  
Proposition 2. IT enhances the complexity of roles for the watcher and for the watched. 
Proposition 3. IT enables highly interactional veillance watcher-watched relationships. 
4.2     IT Transformations of Veillance Goals 
IT monitoring stimulates an increased variety of goals, as well as emergent and co-created goals.  
4.2.1. Increased Diversity of Goals and New Goals. With some notable exceptions, our analysis 
indicates a greater diversity of goals in IT veillance. We provide detailed tables in Appendix D describing 
the coding results with respect to veillance goals. Table D1 shows the diversity of goals while the details 
on the important goals in non-IT and IT veillance are shown in Table D2 together with sample areas and 
illustrative studies for each goal. The one exception to increased goal diversity in IT veillance is profit, 
which is relatively more intensively studied in non-IT contexts. In non-IT veillance, the goals of profit 
and compliance are often co-goals to each other (e.g., Gentry and Shen 2013; Goranova et al. 2017). In 
contrast, in IT veillance, the goals of compliance and profit are increasingly interrelated with a greater 
diversity of other goals, such as provision of benefits (e.g., Kordzadeh and Warren 2017), discovery and 
documentation (Natividad 2014), influence (e.g., Dellarocas 2005; Karwatzki et al. 2017a; 2017b), and 
self-improvement (e.g., Astor et al. 2013).   
Actors in IT veillance often pursue a wider diversity of goals across both shared and distinctive 
patterns of Ww relationships (see Table D3). The diversity is particularly evident in the shared patterns of 
organizations watching customers (Warkentin et al. 2017) and organizations watching employees (e.g., 
Anandarajan 2002; Marsden and Tung 1999).  Furthermore, IT enables goals that are rare or too costly to 
pursue in non-IT veillance, such as discovery, documentation, provision of benefits, and prevention/ 
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protection. For example, the goal of discovery is rarely studied in non-IT veillance (see Riad (2005) for an 
exception) and is typically better facilitated with IT (Li and Sarkar 2013; Twyman et al. 2014), similar to 
the goal of documentation in veillance of physician clinical activities (Rizq 2013) as well in veillance 
enabled by algorithms (Scott and Orlikowski 2014). Likewise, the goal of provision of benefits is linked 
to IT-enabled decreased costs of data exchange between heterogenous participants (Anderson et al. 2017; 
Kohli and Kettinger 2004) and improved quality prediction of watched behaviors (Brynjolfsson et al. 
2016; Singh et al. 2011; Xu et al. 2009). Several studies do admit that IT-enabled sharing of personal 
information among different parties can be beneficial (e.g., Kordzadeh and Warren 2017) and that 
provision of benefits is subjective among diverse watched (Dinev et al. 2008). Finally, IT stimulates the 
goals of prevention/protection in veillance within information management, economic efficiency, 
healthcare, and security (Adjerid et al. 2016; Vance et al. 2015). Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 4. IT enables wide diversity of veillance goals across watcher-watched relationships. 
 
4.2.2 Emergent and Co-created Goals. As the relationships between watcher and watched unfold, 
novel properties of goals emerge and evolve in IT veillance. For example, while an IS monitoring system 
was originally introduced to gain compliance, provide information and influence clinical decisions by 
managers, some doctors being monitored used it for provision of benefits (to negotiate more resources) 
(Doolin 2004). Similarly, a novel IS system designed to ensure employee compliance with respect to 
resources met resistance, leading to a new mutual goal of provision of benefits (access to resources) 
(Silva and Backhouse 2003). Alvarez (2008) discusses how an enterprise system was introduced for 
compliance in a large research university but led to loss of compliance, employee resistance, and the 
emergent goal of self-improvement, enabling employees’ reskilling and system workaround. Mobile 
technologies aimed at providing employees with more freedom have led to tighter control and compliance 
monitoring (Leclercq-Vandelannoitte et al. 2014; Mazmanian et al. 2013).  
IT veillance affords opportunities for the watched to be involved in the (co)creation of veillance 
goals. In non-IT veillance, goals were traditionally a prerogative of the watchers; participation of the 
watched in goal creation was mainly limited to relationships of peer veillance. In contrast, the watched 
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can participate in co-creation of goals across a variety of IT veillance relationships, including developing 
new veillance goals beyond those deployed by watchers (e.g., Brocklehurst 2001; Iedema and Rhodes 
2010). Wareham et al. (1998) discuss the introduction of an ineffective performance monitoring system in 
a large retail firm whose top managers originally designed it for control and compliance purposes. 
Instead, when the watched (technicians) were given authority to co-create and improve the system with 
team self-improvement goals, the system became more effective and overcame resistance. Likewise, 
Iedema and Rhodes (2010) discuss how healthcare nurses co-develop goals, reflections and 
interpretations of video-based surveillance in a hospital, enabling self-improvement and information 
provision to others to develop as emergent goals. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 5. IT enables emergent and co-created veillance goals. 
4.3 IT Transformations of Veillance Apparatus  
IT facilitates hard and mixed veillance mechanisms, enables diffusion of veillance mechanisms and 
facilitates manipulative actions on the part of both the watchers and the watched.  
4.3.1. Prevailing Hard and Mixed Veillance Mechanisms. In non-IT contexts, organizations 
typically rely on hard coercive veillance mechanisms to conduct VoB and softer mechanisms of 
persuasion for VoS and VoC (e.g., Bernstein 2012; Courpasson 2000; Rutherford et al. 2007). 
Distribution of hard and soft mechanisms differs substantially for IT veillance and with some nuances this 
holds true across shared and distinctive patterns. Table 5 shows that papers discussing soft mechanisms in 
IT veillance are relatively few compared to cases discussing hard mechanisms.   
--- Insert Table 5 here--- 
IT enables location-based tracking of customers (Xu et al. 2009-10) and remote workers 
(Brocklehurst 2001; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte et al. 2014; Mazmanian et al. 2013); monitoring of theft in 
restaurants (Pierce et al. 2015); hospital employees’ hand hygiene (Staats et al. 2017); concealed 
information (Twyman et al. 2014); traders’ information access (Tung and Marsden 2000); illegal market 
trading (Li et al. 2015) and remote patient health data (Singh et al. 2011). The intensiveness of veillance 
increases both for predominantly IT-mediated jobs, such as exhaustive monitoring in call centers (Deery 
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et al. 2002) as well as jobs where IT-monitoring complements offline activities; e.g., electronic individual 
monitoring that increases peer scrutiny in teams (Sewell 1998) and shifting physicians’ behaviors closer 
to congruence with management’s goals (Kohli and Kettinger 2004). Tracking capacities embedded in IT 
tools (e.g., RFID tags, mobile devices, sensors) enable monitoring of bodies and behaviors of employees 
beyond formal workplaces (Allmer 2011; Pierce et al. 2015). The possibilities and spaces for hard 
veillance mechanisms (e.g. marking of the body, physical inscription) are thus extended beyond fixed 
spatial locations to capture employee behaviors and bodies, both within formal and informal 
organizational spaces (Stanko and Beckman 2015) as well as in private locations (Brocklehurst 2001). 
IT-enabled monitoring leads to the emergence of more intensive group-level norms that act as 
coercive mechanisms, including ‘anytime anywhere’ norms of responsiveness (Guillemette et al. 2009; 
Lee 2017), self-regulation (Short and Toffel 2010) and self-auditing (Levay and Waks 2009). Dissolving 
traditionally bounded organizational veillance spaces can transform traditional panopticon veillance into a 
portable panopticon (De Saulles and Horner 2011), also referred to as ‘free control’ (Leclercq-
Vandelannoitte et al. 2014, p. 543), and post-panopticon (Baudrillard 2006, 2007; Sewell and Barker 
2006) that relies on subtle and relatively invisible (but intrusive) veillance. IT intensifies government 
veillance with variable effects on the subjectification of the watched (Stahl et al. 2012; Williams 1996). 
For example, the UK National Health Service requires professionals to collect and document data on their 
patients using computers and standardized software, serving rational aims of state-funded health provision 
rather than subjective needs of patients, while persuading patients to accept new norms (Rizq 2013). 
Based on the above analysis, we propose:  
Proposition 6. IT intensifies veillance conducted with hard or mixed (hard and soft) mechanisms. 
 
4.3.2. Diffused IT Veillance Mechanisms. Typically, in non-IT veillance the watcher owns, 
designs and implements control systems. IT enables veillance mechanisms to become diffused, i.e. 
owned, designed and implemented by actors other than the watchers. IT allows different actors (hotels, 
customers, government and citizens) to perform intensive monitoring without owning the tools, knowing 
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how these are designed, without controlling the implementation of the veillance mechanisms (Ameripour 
et al. 2010; Scott and Orlikowski 2014).  
An emerging stream of research specifically discusses the roles and impacts of diverse, 
intermediate actors influencing processes and results of monitoring. Examples include third party 
intermediaries who authenticate users before granting participation to data repositories (Crossler and 
Posey 2017); companies mediating and moderating reviews and message exchanges between customers 
and hotels (Scott and Orlikowski 2014); healthcare providers sharing medical and healthcare data 
(Adjerid et al. 2016; Anderson et al. 2017; Li and Qin 2017) and governments whose tracking of 
consumer online transactions and citizen data is increasingly justified to detect and prevent security 
breaches, fraud, terrorist activities, and other crimes (Dinev et al. 2008). Diffused IT veillance 
mechanisms also enable the watched to increasingly participate in the co-creation of norms and 
implementation processes of monitoring (e.g.Visser et al. 2018) and claim ownership of collected data 
(Spiekermann and Korunovska 2017). Thus, we propose:  
Proposition 7. IT enables the mechanisms of veillance to be owned, designed, and implemented 
by multiple actors beyond the watchers. 
 
4.3.3. Manipulative Actions of Veillance Actors. Both watchers and watched in IT veillance 
engage in reciprocally manipulative behavior. First, in non-IT monitoring, the watcher needs to make the 
watched aware that they might be visible for the disciplining effect of the panopticon to take place (e.g., 
Foucault 1977). Recent studies increasingly discuss manipulative effects of IT monitoring unknown or 
invisible to the watched (e.g., Ball 2009; Kubitschko 2015; Newell and Marabelli 2015). For example, 
remote diagnostics technology embedded in physical products is often invisible to employees but might 
be used by companies to analyze their behavior (Jonsson 2006). Contrary to the panoptical model, the 
informative capacity of IT enables “uninformed” veillance (e.g., Newell and Marabelli 2015). Ethical 
responsibilities become vested in organizations (e.g., Buhl and Mueller 2010; Jonsson 2006), requiring 
further research that watches how these responsibilities are framed and discharged (Adelstein and Clegg 
2015). Further, watchers can manipulate the visibility of information via IT tools, such as altering or 
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playing with different features of monitoring systems (Grant and Higgins 1991), campaigning to get 
customers to write online reviews, or writing fake or defamatory reviews (Scott and Orlikowski 2014).  
IT enables watchers to manipulate the behavior of the watched based on highly tailored veillance 
mechanisms (Howard and Woolley 2016; Kosinski et al. 2013). For example, sensors in cars can be used 
to collect data in real-time to modify driver behavior through punishments (real-time rate hikes, financial 
penalties, curfews, engine lock-downs) or rewards (rate discounts, coupons, gold stars to redeem for 
future benefits) (Zuboff, 2016). IT allows for government attempts to influence public opinion with 
counter propaganda movements (Ameripour et al. 2010) but even more powerful is the facility to play to 
dispositions that require no implanting but are already there, merely awaiting recognition. The recognition 
is twofold: first, by veillance and its messages and second, by the gaze of familiarity with which the 
messages are received by those who become their subject. The use of Facebook data by Cambridge 
Analytica on social network ‘likes’ was premised on such foundations (Clegg et al. 2019): bots projected 
messages to those who probabilistically estimated to be empathetically open to the messages sent. 
Empathetic tendencies, once known, can be curated and manipulated. Research provides increasing 
evidence of the application of this new model by organizations, such as when companies provide real-
time situated and personalized feedback to selected employees via private chats (Stanko and Beckman 
2015), evaluate employee behavior via appliances with embedded remote diagnostics technology 
(Jonsson 2006), or directly access consumer appliances in households (Warkentin et al. 2017).  
IT veillance enables various manipulations by the watched. In non-IT settings, visibility is often 
imposed on the watched in VoB (e.g., factory floor worker uniforms, compulsory Jewish badges in Nazi 
Germany (Clegg et al. 2006) that internalize goals and comply with team or organizational norms in VoS 
and VoC (Clegg et al. 2006). In contrast, the watched can creatively use IT to manipulate their visibility 
in VoB. Thus, the watched in IT veillance can manipulate visibility of their behavior to get more 
resources from the watchers (Doolin 2004), maintain otherwise challenged access to resources (Alvarez 
2008), diversify production reporting between team members and managers (Bernstein 2012), and remain 
unnoticed despite being constantly video-observed (Anteby and Chan 2018). The watched also use IT 
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systems to manipulate their visibility in VoS and VoC to enable displays of professionalism to increase 
their status and appraisal in the eyes of the watcher (Cunha 2013; Visser et al. 2018) and to present a false 
visibility to management providing an impression of compliance (e.g., Cunha and Carugati 2009). IT 
users can exchange visibility/privacy aspects for some benefits (e.g., Bélanger and Crossler 2019; 
Crossler and Bélanger 2019; Dinev et al. 2006; Pavlou 2011). Under conditions of IT veillance “subjects 
participate, to a significant extent, in the very construction and institutionalization of the virtual cells 
which are used to categorize them” (Brivot and Gendron 2011, p. 152). Thus, we propose:  
Proposition 8. IT facilitates manipulations of veillance by both the watchers and the watched. 
4.4. Transformations to Veillance Foci 
Our analysis illustrates that IT enables veillance of all three foci but research privileges investigation of 
VoB. As Table 6 highlights, the relative percentage of papers studying VoB is higher in IT veillance 
across both shared and distinctive patterns of the watcher-watched relationships. Furthermore, IT 
dynamically shapes and dramatically transforms the epistemology of the focus of veillance. In non-IT 
veillance, the focus of veillance is known in advance and the interests of the watchers in the watched pre-
conceptualized as focusing on a particular aspect (body, soul or commitment). Such veillance, structured 
around known a priori focus, aligns with other elements (e.g., the particular actors, apparatuses, and 
goals). Accordingly, mixed veillance foci (e.g., VoB and VoS) in non-IT veillance relies on two or more 
systems of veillance specifically designed to support each particular focus. For example, VoB relies on a 
system of veillance enabling monitoring of employee bodies and behaviors while VoS focuses on 
specially planned and established organizational or team culture. 
--- Insert Table 6 here --- 
In contrast, IT enables the foci of veillance to be dynamically shaped and emerging during the 
process of veillance, as discussed in Table D4. The original focus of IT veillance on body and behavior 
(VoB) of the watched is often complemented with an emergent VoC and VoS focus. The original IT 
veillance of workers’ location, time and frequency of e-mails, and online activities is often complemented 
by emerging norms for continuous responsiveness, availability and engagement. These display employee 
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commitment and professionalism (e.g., Kohli and Kettinger 2004; Visser et al. 2018). Additionally, an 
emerging culture of individual addiction to devices enabling continuous peer visibility, collective 
monitoring of information flows can also occur (e.g., Mazmanian et al. 2013; Stanko and Beckman 2015).  
The analysis of the literature also reveals a possible extension of veillance foci to a new 
dimension, namely the veillance of the future being inscribed in the candidate’s present through veillance 
of traces of their past. IT automatically facilitates cumulative aggregation of personal data from multiple 
databases to use for simulation of the future. For example, information aggregation and verification firms 
such as Choicepoint offer aggregation of data such as pre-employment screening of bankruptcy records, 
civil cases, liens, criminal records, education and employment histories, media coverage, judgment 
histories, credit reports, and address and driving histories (Allmer 2011). IT veillance then becomes 
increasingly used for predicting “the likelihood of this or that person turning out to be a responsible and 
hardworking employee” (Lyon 2001, p. 41), anticipating the patterns of future behavior of the watched 
(Stanko and Beckman 2015), making visible “who the worker will have been, what the worker will have 
produced, what path his or her career will have taken” (Bogard 1996, p. 117). Veillance of the future not 
only makes probabilistic bets on what will happen but also leads to the active formation, manipulation 
and limitation of the “free” choices of those whose data traces are being watched (Zuboff 2015; 2016). 
The intensely media-debated case of Cambridge Analytica’s massive use of IT-facilitated cumulative 
aggregation of personal data, its use for veillance of future and related manipulations and consequences 
for the democracy, provides an illustrative example in this regard (Clegg et al, 2017; Metcalf 2018; Tas 
and Kimpen 2020). The current relatively small amount of research on this topic, particularly in terms of 
the ethical implications, requires extension. 
To summarize, instead of a pre-fixed focus of interest (e.g. body, soul, commitment), the watched 
become dynamic and unique subjects for which IT-mediated veillance systems are crafted. Veillance can 
be dynamically adjusted, mixed and/or extended in its focus. Therefore, we propose:  
Proposition 9. IT enables emergent and dynamically adjusted veillance foci. 
5 Theoretical implications 
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What elements of the veillance system are transformed by IT and how they change has been theoretically 
analyzed (Whetten 1989). Our findings reveal significant IT-enabled transformations of all elements of 
the veillance system and the relationships between the watcher and the watched. Based on our findings 
and further reflection of how these transformations relate to each other, we develop an action net model of 
IT veillance in the digital age. 
5.1 Action Net Model of IT Veillance in the Digital Age 
An action net is a system of differentiated actors loosely or temporarily related by the constitutive work of 
the system (Czarniawska 2004; Lindberg and Czarniawska 2006). The IT veillance action net model is 
produced by the actants and actions of heterogenous veillance actors, their diverse goals, flexible roles 
and relationships, apparatuses, and boundaries, which together create dynamic and multiple foci.  
In conventional (non-IT) monitoring systems, relationships between the watcher and the watched 
are typically unidirectional (e.g. top-down or bottom-up) or lateral (e.g. peer veillance), with goals being 
defined prior to veillance. The participating actors are known in advance and the apparatus of veillance is 
constructed before the act of monitoring to enable a particular focus for the veillance (body, soul or 
commitment). Each conceptualization requires a different design in terms of actors, goals and veillance 
mechanisms; they are not mutually exclusive and can be used additively. In the action net model of IT 
veillance, the relationships between the watcher and the watched are mediated by actant devices that are 
multidirectional and allow for diverse manipulations. Goals might emerge before and after the act of 
veillance, relating to participating actors who are multiple, heterogenous, emergent, unbound and often 
unpredictable. Relationships between the watcher and the watched may be mediated by a variety of 
intermediate actors and actants that can be involved in various complex and flexible roles with the 
watchers and the watched. For instance, during the 2020 pandemic the role of phone manufacturers, such 
as Apple, in refusing to share location information forced governments to rethink tracing strategies 
(Fowler 2020). In consequence, rather than relating users to central data bases, several governments opted 
for more decentralized approaches supported by Apple and Google phones (Busvine and Rinke 2020). 
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These strategic shifts underline the changeable boundaries of the veillance system and multiple veillance 
foci. Figure 2 illustrates the IT Veillance action net model.  
--- Insert Figure 2 here --- 
Existing models, such as the panopticon, synopticon (e.g., Foucault 1977, 1982) focus on a fixed 
set of actor relationships and roles or are based on data flows enabled by IT networks in which actors are 
no longer central, such as dataveillance, assemblages and panspectron models (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987; Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Haggerty 2006). The action net model of IT veillance differs 
significantly. It brings the relationships between actors to the center of analysis and presents veillance as a 
flexible and emergent decentralized interconnected web with flexible boundaries, roles, and relationships 
between heterogenous actors and actants involved in the system of veillance. It illustrates that the net is 
not defined by the structural/hierarchical position of the actors but by the relationships between 
heterogenous veillance participants and their cumulative abilities to organize, impact and otherwise 
manipulate the net, including influences on dispositions of roles, visibilities and inclusion/exclusion of 
other relevant actors and intermediates. In this regard, our model builds on and extends calls to re-think 
the role of the watched in IT monitoring as no longer passive (Anteby and Chan 2018; Scott and 
Orlikowski 2014; Visser et al. 2018).  
The action net does not define a particular pre-defined actor relationship pattern or set of 
organizational boundaries (Czarniawska 2004) but is continuously re-established by flexible system 
relationships, enabling multiple dynamic foci co-shaped by inputs from flexible watchers, watched and 
intermediate devices and actants.  In the action net model there are diverse veillance participants and 
roles; for instance, research can focus on intermediate participants, such as companies campaigning for 
customers to write reviews (Scott and Orlikowski 2014), watchers disabling consumer appliances or 
Internet access (Stanko and Beckman 2015; Warkentin et al. 2017) as well as attempts to counter 
propaganda movement by governments (Ameripour et al. 2010). Additionally, research can focus on 
those that are watched who become self-aware and learn to co-create and manage how they might be 
(in)visible, self-present, attract resources and attention to the watched (Anteby and Chan 2018; Brivot and 
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Gendron 2011; Doolin 2004; Visser et al. 2018). By changing their visibility, actors can manipulate the 
action net, thus blurring boundaries between pre-established roles.  
The action net model is particularly useful for describing complex and flexible Ww relationships 
in the digital age. For example, instead of explaining Covid-19 contact tracing surveillance as based on 
pre-defined Ww relationships or data flows and assemblages, the action net model focuses on a flexible 
web of Ww relationships, roles, and boundaries that emerge out of unprompted interplay between 
heterogenous actors (governments, healthcare organizations, citizens, and diverse intermediators (e.g. 
computer, app and Internet providers)). For instance, the German government initially backed a 
centralized contact tracing standard known as the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing 
(PEPP-PT), which required Apple to change the settings on its iPhones, which it declined to do; hence, 
Germany opted for a decentralized approach that involved users opting to share their phone number and 
details of symptoms (Busvine and Rinke 2020). The action net model also allows considering multiple 
and dynamic foci of veillance. For example, as debates on obligatory use of Covi-passes 
(https://www.covipass.com/) reveal, while COVID-19 contact tracing might start as VoB, it may soon 
evolve into VoS/VoC (McCurry 2020). 
The action net model of veillance offers two important theoretical advantages. First, it captures 
IT-enabled flexibility, complexity, unpredictability and constant evolution of heterogenous actors and 
their relationships as transformative IT impacts in monitoring (e.g., Haggerty 2006; Leclercq-
Vandelannoitte et al. 2014; Mann and Ferenbok 2013; Zuboff 2015; 2016). Second, the model suggests 
new logics underlying the relationships between the watcher and the watched.  
5.2 New Logics of Action Net IT Veillance Systems 
In action net IT veillance systems, new logics characterize the relationships between the watcher and the 
watched. The underlying logics of the action net functionalities are enabled by the unique characteristics 
of IT artifacts such as their editability, distributedness, granularity, interactivity, and re-programmability 
(Garud et al. 2008; Kallinikos et al. 2010; Manovich 2001; Yoo et al. 2010) (see Table 2), which existing 
studies on veillance have yet to incorporate in knowledge and assumptions about IT artifacts.  Such 
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emerging understanding of IT artifacts is particularly useful for grasping how the functioning of IT 
veillance systems and the relationships between the watcher and the watched are affected by the 
transformations identified in the findings. We next discuss the proposed logics in contrast to the 
assumptions of extant monitoring theories, highlighting the underlying reasoning of the logics as well as 
research questions and areas for future research. Table D5 in Appendix D summarizes our arguments.  
5.2.1 Flexibility of Veillance Elements. The elements of the action net model of IT veillance 
are flexible and dynamically changing. In traditional theorizing, both the watchers and the watched 
constitute specific group(s) of actors who operate in a given context defined by the basic relations of 
power and authority that constitute the employment relations characterizing specific organizations. IT-
mediated veillance systems are, by contrast, unbounded in terms of the scope and nature of participating 
actors and diversity of their relationship patterns. Likewise, goals, mechanisms, and foci become flexible 
and dynamic in the IT veillance system.  
Unique characteristics enable the functioning of IT veillance systems on this new logic. For 
example, IT editability (Constantiou and Kallinikos 2015) enables multiple actors (e.g. not only watchers, 
but also watched and intermediate actors) to adjust diverse elements of veillance, such as changing 
veillance goals, mechanisms (e.g. changing between OFF to ON settings for exposure notifications) or the 
focus during the process of veillance or (re)discovering and (re)creating the actual focus based on the 
already collected data. The distributedness of IT artifacts creates a network environment that is 
borderless, i.e. where, as a result of IT-enabled interconnectedness (Kallinikos et al. 2010), organizational 
boundaries do not exist. A heterogeneous and unbounded constellation of actors can participate, such as 
telephony carriers, mobile phone OS (Apple, Google), apps on top of OS, as well as privacy advocates, 
miscellaneous technology vendors and so on (Nambisan et al. 2017). Diffused agency of veillance acts as 
another source of flexibility; diverse veillance goals and mechanisms can be owned, designed and used by 
multiple actors, facilitating cumulative aggregation of personal data from multiple databases that enable 
simulation of future behavior, preferences and possible commitments of those being tracked through data 
traces (e.g., Baudrillard 2006; Marwick 2014; Marx 2002; Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013; 
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O'Harrow 2006; Van Dijck 2014). IT granularity enables multiple actors to introduce tailored changes to 
veillance goals, mechanisms, and foci, increasing flexibility of the veillance process beyond the full 
control of the watchers. For example, employee knowledge about how different blocks of IT surveillance 
systems are connected and what their gaps and knowledge spots are enables their practices of invisibility 
(Anteby and Chan 2018). This is also one of the reasons why IT veillance over outsiders is easier than IT 
veillance over insiders, whose awareness of local knowledge and specificities creates more room for 
unexpected deviations in organizational information security (Vance et al. 2013). Likewise, interactivity 
of IT enables re-invention of veillance goals; for instance, when information collected by companies such 
as Choicepoint or Acxiom can be packaged and resold to interested actors (Turow 2011). An original 
veillance goal of profit might become associated with prevention of risky behavior and protection of 
resources (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Stahl et al. 2012; Vance et al. 2013). Location data can be used after the 
fact for contact tracing purposes, while Clearview AI face recognition technology can use scraped images 
for completely different purposes. When Clearview scraped images from sites such as Facebook and 
Linkedin over their objections, while clearly unethical, is borderline legal. Finally, IT reprogramability 
further extends veillance flexibility, enabling dynamic adjustments of veillance elements (goals, foci, 
mechanisms) as veillance proceeds (Jonsson 2006; Stanko and Beckman 2015; Warkentin et al. 2017). 
These new logics create profound implications for the design of veillance systems. In particular, 
they imply a need for theorists and practitioners to design IT veillance systems for incompleteness (Garud 
et al. 2008) by focusing on pragmatic and emergent system design approaches that allow exploration of 
systems in which boundaries, system elements and characteristics are not stable, where there might be 
multiple designers, with diverse visions of the veillance system boundaries and characteristics. 
5.2.2 Diffused Actor Roles. The action net IT veillance system implies that various veillance 
participants might engage in multiple roles simultaneously on an emergent diffused basis. In contrast to 
non-IT veillance, where the watcher and the watched acquire their role because of an a priori designated 
structural position, actors in the action net system acquire their roles in the process of watching or being 
watched by other actors in the action net. The new logics challenge conceptualization of the watchers as a 
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central and coherent group of actors. Instead, it implies that the watcher(s) will be an emergent and 
distributed net of multiple actors whose heterogeneities might create important complementarities, 
extending joint capabilities but also creating unexpected tensions. As our analysis illustrates, multiple 
actors can participate in monitoring as watchers through associations and networks. Likewise, the new 
logics challenge conceptualizations of the watched as simply following or resisting their roles as defined 
by the watchers exercising veillance. Instead, the watched in the action net can be actively involved in the 
veillance process through IT-enabled manipulations, activation of various intermediators, shaping the 
boundaries between the watcher and the watched as changeable, ambiguous and subject to networked 
relationships.  
The above logics are enabled in important ways by the IT characteristics discussed in Table 2.  IT 
editability enables easy alliance with new veillance actors as well as exit from existing ones, bypassing 
the original watcher and various inclusive intermediated actors (e.g., monitoring system vendors, 
information aggregation firms, experts supporting and interpreting IT systems). For example, mobile 
carriers can sell location information to less well-known data aggregation companies that sell the data on 
to operators such as bounty hunters (Valentino-DeVries 2020). IT distributedness enables the watched to 
collect and store information with multiple IT devices, thus co-creating their veillance (Brivot and 
Gendron 2011; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte et al. 2014) as well as reversing the visibility of veillance actors 
so that the watchers can be known to the watched who can be concealed and anonymized. For example, in 
TripAdvisor relevant hotel managers can be known to the anonymized public of online reviewers and 
platform users (Orlikowski and Scott 2014). Together, IT editability and distributedness enable multiple 
diffused monitoring actors and actants to generate much more detailed and diverse information about the 
watched, increasing the probability that they will be known in new ways (e.g., Cunha and Carugati 2013; 
Howard and Woolley 2016; Kosinski et al. 2013; Pierce et al. 2015) while also unintendedly increasing 
their visibility to third parties (Leonardi 2014; Leonardi and Vaast 2017). Instead of being known through 
a pre-designed veillance apparatus that has a specific focus for monitoring, those watched become known 
through the network of mobilized mediating actors and actants. Such mediation allows veillance to build 
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simultaneously on multiple foci (body, soul, commitment) and to inscribe multiple actant boundaries to 
learn continuously about the watched in many emergent ways (Barad 2007; Orlikowski and Scott 2014). 
Further, IT granularity enables data about those watched to be broken down into minute details (e.g. 
fitness devices that provide self-monitoring of water intake, heart rate, and sleep stages), which enables 
the engagement of the watched in (co)-construction of veillance mechanisms by deciding what to make 
visible within the veillance system. IT granularity also contributes to the diffusion of actor roles by 
enabling some devices of IT veillance to act as agents themselves, such as bots and algorithms, sometimes 
beyond the ways specified by the IT designers (Statt 2020). Likewise, IT interactivity enables the watched 
to modify the original uses of IT and become co-creators of IT veillance systems (Alvarez 2008; Anteby 
and Chan 2018; Brivot and Gendron 2011; Doolin 2004) thus blurring pre-assigned roles. Finally, IT re-
programmability enables a performative inclusion/exclusion of the intermediate actors to the 
conceptualizations of the watched and their real-time and future behavior modifications. For example, the 
new automotive telematics industry uses intrusive surveillance capabilities to combine monitoring of 
locations and conditions of vehicles with impressive amounts of knowledge of personal data about the 
driver that can affect real-life driving behavioral modifications (Zuboff 2016). 
The above logics condition areas for future research on the dynamics of veillance systems, 
including the formation of the diffused actor roles, their continuous change, (re)negotiation, interplay, and 
tensions. Table D5 in Appendix D details areas for future research in this area.  
5.2.3 Cumulative Extended Manipulations. The action net IT veillance system operates on a 
logic of cumulative extended manipulations of diverse veillance participants. As discussed in the findings 
section, in IT veillance both the watchers and the watched can engage in diverse manipulations previously 
impossible in non-IT veillance. Extended manipulative capabilities of the watchers include non-human 
oversight and action on the watched; possibilities to use veillance systems owned by other actors as well 
as tailored veillance mechanisms (e.g. predictive bets). The latter, in particular, enable the watchers 
significantly to surpass non-IT panoptical models derived from Foucault alert to the ever-present 
possibility of the experience of being under surveillance leading to normalization of the watched. In 
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contrast, IT veillance already takes patterning for granted as it merely needs to work with that which is 
already constituted; for example, through knowledge of Facebook likes and networks, for example, which 
can be used to frame a message accordingly (Clegg et al. 2019). Likewise, extended manipulative 
capabilities of the watched significantly exceed those relatively limited manipulations available to the 
watched in non-IT veillance, including “systematic soldering” (Clegg et al. 2006), “workarounds” 
(Seaman and Erlen 2015), or “making out” games (Burawoy 1979; Roy 1959). In contrast, the watched in 
IT veillance can (co)create and manage their visibility and engage various intermediate actors to further 
manipulate veillance processes and results. Finally, intermediate actors can also engage in veillance 
manipulations. Such extended manipulative capabilities emphasize the importance of cumulative 
manipulations, rather than manipulations of specific actors. 
The logic of cumulative extended manipulations is enabled by specific IT, similarly to previous 
logics. IT editability enables the watched to be continuously engaged in managing their visibility. For 
example, the watched who use (VPN) applications to access region-restricted websites need to 
continuously upgrade their available applications as the watchers learn to block these. Likewise, those 
who seek to increase their visibility (e.g., marketing graduates promoting themselves on social media 
accounts to catch the attention of potential employers) need continuously to modify their IT choices to 
upgraded settings to stay competitive. IT distributedness enables intermediate actors to shape the action 
net of IT veillance beyond direct watchers and watched and beyond particular organizational boundaries 
(Czarniawska 2004). As remarked when discussing sousveillance, murder by a policeman, captured on 
video, had significant effects for the now-global Black Lives Matter movement. The action net model 
provides a valuable framework demonstrating how a simple mobile phone video can have global effects 
as an intermediary device. IT distributedness also enables those watching to employ a system of veillance 
owned by others instead of constructing their own. As illustrated by the case of Cambridge Analytica, 
such intermediate actors can use already existing relationships (e.g., data collection of Facebook on its 
users) to build their own adjusted veillance system. Granularity of IT facilitates unique tailoring and 
adjustment of veillance mechanisms for each subject of monitoring. IT interactivity enables users to 
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activate different IT functions, thus enabling both watchers and watched to play with visibility and 
anonymity, exchange a part of their visibility/privacy for some benefits (Bélanger and Crossler 2019; 
Bélanger and Xu 2015; Pavlou 2011), or use IT for manipulative purposes in ways that empower them 
(Albrechtslund 2008; Ellerbrook 2010; Eslami et al. 2015). For example, online political content is often 
programmed to be commented on by bots in a radical way that attracts multiple responses and increases 
visibility (and thus importance) of the comment to a general public. Finally, IT reprogrammability 
enables new veillance mechanisms not possible with non-IT tools, such as hyper-real simulation, data 
veillance and real-time behavior modification capability by manipulating in process those being watched 
but unaware (Ball 2009; Howard and Woolley 2016; Jonsson 2006; Zuboff 2015). For example, 
Facebook users are largely unaware that the Facebook Newsfeed algorithm influences which stories and 
posts are visible from the pool of all stories and posts (Eslami et al. 2015). IT re-programmability also 
enables the watched, as much as the watchers, to engage a variety of mediating actants to manipulate the 
processes, results and visibilities of monitoring. For example, participants in TV game shows (or any 
other ranking-based system) could use bots and algorithms trained on profiled data to persuade others to 
vote for them or to bury unfavorable news or reviews deep in Google’s lists. Furthermore, IT re-
programmability enables replacing human oversight with algorithms, bots and the Internet of things that 
not only collect, store and analyze data but also trigger responses to humans and other actants (Jonsson 
2006; Newell and Marabelli 2015). For instance, bots are widely used on Twitter (with approximately 30 
million active accounts being bot driven) to mimic human actors so as to boost follower numbers and re-
tweet content. Bots are also utilized on Wikipedia to track government employees’ edits to Wikipedia or 
on Facebook to attack opponent conversations (Woolley and Howard 2016) but they have limits: they 
cannot recognize fluid and subtle phenomena, such as irony, which cannot be described in simple, 
machine-readable rules. Nonetheless, these developments allow veillance system to function without need 
of supervisors to approve work, removing from the existing system established mechanism of checks and 
balances, while also allowing manipulations in new ways on a massive scale.  
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The above logics triggers important implications that require further analysis. The key 
implications and areas for future research relate to the functioning of IT veillance systems as relying on 
cumulative extended manipulations by multiple actors as well as to power construction and enactments. 
Thus, those being watched that are neither aware nor skillful in IT and in managing their action nets or 
who lack resources to be able to do so can become subject to manipulations by multiple watchers with 
power to shape their experiences and curate goal internalization. In IT-mediated veillance, visibility 
becomes both a tool of control and of presentation of self in which it becomes important to be visible to 
the right person in the right ways. One can use visibility as part of the appraisal of one’s own and peers’ 
work and commitment (Brocklehurst 2001; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte et al. 2014); this can encourage use 
of socially accepted behavior and expectations of being visible (Mathiesen 1997; Pecora 2002) in order to 
avoid exclusion from benefits and resources. These changes have an important potential to affect 
employee accountability, responsibility and knowledge sharing (Aral et al. 2013; Denyer et al. 2011; 
Dong and Wu 2015; Huang et al. 2015; Leonardi 2014; Leonardi and Vaast 2017; Miller and Tucker 
2013). The system of embodied dispositions and tendencies that organize the ways in which individuals 
perceive the social world around them and react to it, the habitus, is affected. The ability to manage 
visibility and opt out of being monitored becomes an aspect of power in modern organizations.  
5.2.4 Emergent Non-Linear Actor Relationships. Classically, organization was founded on 
labor processes in which communication, coordination and control based on pre-planned actor behavior 
and focus of veillance were central to efficient exploitation of resources (Clegg and Dunkerley 2013). 
Monitoring provided a critical practice in this regard, enabling the watcher to plan and predict the 
behavior of the watched (Clegg et al. 2006). Compared to extant theories that consider IT as an enabling 
tool for enhanced control and predictability, the action net model of IT veillance builds on a new logic 
that favors unpredictability and emergence of the participating actors and their relationships (e.g., 
Nambisan et al. 2017).  
Specific IT properties guarantee the emergence of actor roles and relationships and limited or 
temporary control over monitoring systems. IT editability motivates diverse veillance actors to 
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continuously update and refine their roles, participation and dynamics in IT veillance. Instead of 
traditional conceptualization of watchers as active and powerful actors and the watched as passive 
recipients (e.g., Anteby and Chan 2018), the action net model of IT veillance conceptualizes roles and 
relationships between diverse actors as emergent, non-linear and subject to potential changes and 
modifications. IT distributedness allows the watchers and the watched to be expanded to unplanned 
“others”, a process that will inevitably disturb previously delineated roles, dynamics and modes framing 
watcher-watched relationships. Consider, for example, social media influencers allowing visitors to watch 
while at the same time the visitors are being watched by YouTube/Google as well as, to a limited extent, 
by the influencers. IT distributedness further contributes to emergent and non-linear actor relationships by 
enabling an unbounded variety of actors who might participate in the veillance system in various ways, 
following diverse goals, constructing their own or using other actors’ mechanisms of veillance, 
dynamically changing veillance foci, as we have seen with the development of contact tracing apps during 
the Covid-19 pandemic. IT granularity enables increased knowledge about the watched in a diversity of 
areas, often in unpredictable and emergent ways (Zuboff 2015; Zuboff 2019). IT interactivity contributes 
to emergent actor relationships in IT veillance nets through the interplay of compatibilities (or lack of 
these) across diverse actors, goals, mechanisms and foci. For example, those developing algorithms for 
data collection might inscribe different assumptions in the code compared with how the watchers use the 
technology (Newell and Marabelli 2015), enabling the development of less predictable and stable IT 
veillance systems. Emergent veillance action nets can deviate significantly from those originally designed 
and may not be fully controlled by those watching the functioning of IT monitoring systems, suggesting 
important changes to the design and functioning of an effective veillance system. IT reprogramability 
contributes dynamic and emergent changes in the IT veillance system through enabling mobilizations of 
both human and non-human actants as networks of mediating agencies. In non-IT veillance, the mediating 
agencies are usually specialized personnel, such as front-line supervisors (Dunkerly 2013). The more 
distributed IT is in terms of supporting agents, the more complex and branched will be the system of 
mediating agencies that might influence monitoring. Communication, coordination and control switches 
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from being relayed and mediated through actors to being embedded in actants as the passage points in 
circuits of power (Clegg 1989). 
The above logics of emergent non-linear actor relationships imply a need to re-think the 
effectiveness, design and power enactment in IT veillance systems, as no longer apparatus attuned to a 
particular type of veillance system. Instead, their effectiveness depends on incorporating multiple related 
and networked actors within action nets, an ability to influence inclusion/exclusion of actors or to 
manipulate others, as well as to be able to defend their self from others’ manipulations. The power of the 
watched and intermediate actors who can use IT to manipulate gaze and visibility, thus co-shaping the 
veillance system in emergent ways, needs to be taken into account. In particular, future research is needed 
to re-think criteria of effectiveness and key sources and agents of power in IT veillance systems, 
possibilities of systematic patterns in the emergent dynamics of actor relationships, and impacts of 
inclusion/exclusion of certain actors on the disposition of other actors in the action net (see Table D5).  
5.3 Future Research  
In addition to the recommendations for future research noted above, our findings suggest the need for 
studies in two major areas. First, we identified several gaps in knowledge of veillance elements. With 
regard to veillance actors, some relationship patterns, such as employee peer veillance and organizational 
peer veillance, have received less attention in IT veillance as compared to studies of non-IT veillance. 
Second, with some rare exceptions (e.g., Ameripour et al. 2010), our analysis of veillance actors indicates 
that the government is almost never the watched in either IT or non-IT veillance, With an ever increasing 
role of government in data collection in many critical domains of healthcare, security and education, more 
research is required in this area. Third, some topics are exclusively studied in non-IT settings, such as 
monitoring of corporate governance and boards of directors (e.g., Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017Goranova 
et al. 2017) and might benefit from studies of veillance enabled by IT. Further research on practices and 
implications of manipulative aspects of veillance mechanisms as well as dynamically shaped veillance 
foci and veillance of the future are required. In particular, further research is needed on the ethical 
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implications of veillance of the future, which involves the formation, manipulation and limitation of the 
“free” choices of those whose data traces are being watched.  
The new logics of the action net model suggest important questions and areas for future research. 
Thus, following the logics of editability of veillance elements, research is needed to shed light on the 
design of unbounded systems. In particular, future studies need to develop methods for designing 
deliberately incomplete and emergent IT veillance systems (Garud et al. 2008; 2006) with flexible 
boundaries and elements, examining whether and how the primary patterns of the watcher-watched 
relationships influence how veillance systems evolve, exploring the problem of compatibility when 
multiple designers’ visions of the veillance system boundaries and characteristics do not cohere. 
Following the logics of distributed and interactive actor roles, further studies are needed on the complex 
and non-liner relationships between heterogenous watchers who might compete in circuits of power to 
manipulate each other. The complex multi-actor and distributed nature of the watchers’ impacts on the 
design of monitoring systems enabled by the specific properties of IT artifacts are yet to be incorporated 
by theories of monitoring and require further studies. 
The logics of cumulative actor manipulations imply that the functioning of the veillance system, 
its boundaries, visibility design and power dispositions are co-created by a multitude of actors. Further 
research is needed regarding the functioning of veillance systems: how do the interplays of various actor 
manipulations impact elements of the veillance system and actor boundaries and roles? How do veillance 
actors in different roles manipulate veillance systems? The logics also underline a need to re-
conceptualize power relations in IT veillance. In particular, what is the relational role of IT expertise and 
mastering for manipulation? What relationships allow veillance systems to be manipulated without 
ownership? How can some actors involved in social or organizational relations opt out of monitoring? 
Future research needs to understand the formation of new monitoring modes of power that enable some 
watcher(s) to engage, orchestrate, and manage other heterogenous watchers; for example, the construction 
of the Social Credit System with which the Chinese government collects massive information about 
citizens from multiple heterogenous watchers (Liang et al. 2018). In this regard, more research on 
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understanding the IT expertise of the watchers (e.g. in designing and using algorithms and bots) and their 
capacity to interpret and manipulate the network of related actors is needed. Skills need to be honed not 
only in IT but also in network effects on extant action nets of these actants: how do the strategic 
contingencies change, for example, when the obligatory passage points flow through actants that 
transform the relations of actors? Likewise, theories of organizational monitoring need to explore and 
develop insights into IT-enabled power of the watched to manipulate and influence monitoring. An 
important area of research in this direction would be to understand how activation of diverse action nets 
of watchers with diverse goals and mechanisms of veillance might generate diverse conceptualizations of 
the watched. 
Finally, following the logics of emergent and non-linear actor relationships, studies need to 
further elaborate and explore a variety of situated impacts of the unpredictability and emergent nature of 
monitoring systems in terms of effectiveness, design and power relations. What particular criteria and 
sources of effectiveness might be applied to IT veillance systems with emergent and non-linear actor 
relationships? Do any systematic patterns exist in the emergent dynamics of actor relationships? How 
does inclusion/exclusion of certain actors change conceptualizations of the watched and the dispositions 
of other actors and roles? What are the key sources and agents of power in the action net model of IT 
veillance?  
6 Limitations and Conclusion 
While in-depth review allowed us to identify fundamental transformations enabled by IT, we cannot 
claim to have conducted an exhaustive review although we have provided a foundation for exploring 
contemporary complex and multifaceted IT veillance on which further research might build. Our findings 
reconceive contemporary monitoring, aligning with various authors noting the necessity of doing so (e.g., 
Haggerty 2006; Leclercq-Vandelannoitte et al. 2014; Mann and Ferenbok 2013; Sewell 1998; Zuboff 
2015; 2016). We have not had space to discuss the numerous ethical issues and concerns associated with 
the IT transformations identified. Nonetheless, in line with other research in this area (e.g., Newell and 
Marabelli 2015; Zuboff 2015; 2019), we agree such discussion is fundamentally important. The proposed 
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model provides a frame for much needed research in IT monitoring, including its ethical implications. We 
only reviewed papers from leading journals in two fields, which influenced our total counts and may not 
reveal all that is known about veillance. Finally, while this study focused on contrasting IT and non-IT 
monitoring to explore IT-enabled transformations, it paid limited attention to the possible effects 
generated by the interplay between non-IT and IT monitoring (e.g., Ajunwa et al. 2017).  
To conclude, the paper pioneers the exploration of organizational transformations enabled by IT 
devices, artifacts and capabilities. Based on the proposed veillance concept, typology, and framework, we 
analyzed the literature and identified key IT-enabled transformations in organizational monitoring, 
developed an action net model of IT monitoring, and proposed key logics on which IT veillance in the 
digital age operate. We also highlighted important implications of our findings for the design and 
functioning of systems of IT monitoring, as well as issues and relations of power and control within these.  
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Table 1. Conceptual Review of Monitoring Terms 










Monitoring designed and enacted by 
watcher who can observe from the 
position of either: 
• Above (i.e. from French “sur” 
(“over”) and ‘veiller’ (“see/watch”)),  
• Below (i.e. from French “sous” 
(“under”) and “veiller” 
(“see/watch”)) 
Government watching 
citizens; managers watching 
employees; firms watching 
customers  
Doolin 2004; 
Lyon 2001; 2006; 
Zuboff 2015; 
2018 
• Offers contradictory insights on the nature of 
the watcher  
• Implies hierarchical top-down relationships 
between watchers and watched 
• Prioritizes actor on particular hierarchical 
side (e.g. from the sur- or the sous- type) 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
 
Sousveillance 
Protestors filming police; 
corporate; citizens watching 
government; CCTV; peer 
monitoring on social media  














Monitoring where the many are 
watched by a few (from Greek “pan” 
(“all”) and “opticon” (“observed”)) 
Actors supervised in 
correctional organizations 
(prisons, clinics, camps); 
citizens monitored by 
government  
Clegg et al. 2012; 
Foucault 1977 
• Does not account for agency of watched, 
implies their consciousness 
• Fails to include flexible organizational spaces 
• Fails to include IT-enabled reciprocal 
interconnections of watcher and watched 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
Electronic/ 
information  
Monitoring with enhanced visibility of 
all IT-mediated actors and processes  
Employees and customers 
monitored by corporations 
via IT systems 
Jonsson 2006; 
Lyon 1994; 
Orlikowski 1991;  
• Fails to include IT-enabled reciprocal 
interconnections of watcher and watched 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
Portable (free 
control)  
Monitoring of all IT-mediated spaces  Corporate monitoring of 
distanced work 





• Fails to incorporate IT-enabled reciprocal 
interconnections of watcher and watched 
• Implies consciousness of being tracked by 
watched 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
Super- IT-enhanced monitoring “without 
walls, windows, towers or guards” 
(Poster 1996, p. 93) 
Electronic databases Poster 1995; 1996  • Fails to incorporate interconnections between 
the watcher and the watched 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
Post- Monitoring enabling softer and more 
distributed forms of control  
Participatory management; 
corporate transparency 
culture; total quality 
management 
Baudrillard 2006; 
2007; du Gay 
2004; Iedema & 
Rhodes, 2010; 
Sewell & Barker 
2006 
• Fails to incorporate IT-enabled reciprocal 
interconnections between the watcher and the 
watched 
• Implies consciousness of being tracked by the 
watched 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
Synopticon Monitoring where many watch the 
few (from Greek “syn” (“with/ 
together”) & “opticon” (“observed”)) 
Politicians scrutinized via the 
masses; celebrities or favorite 





• Fails to incorporate IT-enabled reciprocal 
interconnections of watcher and watched 









IT-enabled systematic monitoring of 
people or groups in order to regulate 
or govern their behaviour  
Customer loyalty cards; 
swipe corporate cards; 
monitoring of truck drivers; 
Google search engine; 
EyeSee Mannequins8 ; 
Google maps app9 
Clarke 1988; 




• Does not include non-IT monitoring 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
Assemblages Monitoring of multi-directional 
temporary data flows (i.e. rhizome-
like structures without one centre) 
created by multiple heterogenous 
actors  
Facebook app; data 
generated, searched, and 
collected from IPhone; 
contemporary policing 
collecting information from 









• Analytically challenged for what to 
include/exclude: filtering of IT precludes 
heterogenous and multidirectional 
connections 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
Panspectron Monitoring that bypasses visible 
practices (e.g., base for panopticon) 
and shifts attention to non-visible 
practices enabled by IT 
Encryption techniques, 
wireless technologies, AI that 
offers new, invisible or hard 
to detect monitoring 
dimensions  
DeLanda 1991 • Focusses on IT-enabled monitoring only 
• Does not take the co-existing forms of 
hierarchical control into account 
• Assumes IT tools as stable objects 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of IT Artifacts as Transformative Agents  
Characteristic Definition Key studies 
Editability Ability of IT to be continuously and systematically modified and updated. (Kallinikos et al. 2013; Leonardi and Vaast 
2017; Lyytinen et al. 2016) 
Distributedness Ability of IT to store and manage data from and to multiple sources, 
actors and institutions. 
(Kallinikos et al. 2013; Majchrzak and Malhotra 
2013; Nambisan et al. 2017) 
Granularity 
(modularity) 
Ability of IT to be decomposable broken down into self-sufficient blocks 
(or modules) down to elementary units. 
(Kallinikos et al. 2013; Manovich 2001; Yoo et 
al. 2010; Zittrain 2008) 
Interactivity Ability of IT to allow users to follow alternative pathways of information 
exploration by activating different functions embedded in the IT. 
(Garud et al. 2008; Kallinikos et al. 2013; 
Lyytinen et al. 2016) 
Re-programmability Ability of IT to be accessible and modifiable by other digital objects. (Kallinikos et al. 2013; Leonardi and Vaast 




8 EyeSee Mannequin, produced by the Italian company Almax, uses facial recognition technology to reveal customers: age range; gender; race; number of people and time and voice recognition applications to listen to 
what shoppers say about mannequins Degli Esposti, S. 2014. When big data meets dataveillance: The hidden side of analytics. Surveillance & Society 12(2) 209-225. 




Figure 1. Conceptual Veillance Web Framework 





Diverse and complex effects of monitoring on  employee behavior and productivity; 
monitoring in the corporate governance and board of directors 
IT
24
Diverse effects of monitoring on employee behavior and productivity driven by new 
technologies (e.g. RFID, ERP, AI, mobile IS); transforamtions of work practices 
NON IT 15
Impacts of employee self-awareness, self-regulation and peer monitoring on job 
performance
IT 1 Third party online and offline surveillance in teams
NON IT 2 Impacts of third-party limited monitoring or its avoidance on behavior outcomes
IT 1 Neuro IS tool for monitoring and improving emotion regulation
NON IT 1 Monitoring in total institution
IT 1 Relationships between user privacy concerns and government surveillance
NON IT 7 Inter-organizational veillance in traditional industries (e.g. construction, sport) 
IT 3 Inter-organizational veillance in indusries that were transformed or enabled by IT
NON-IT 1 Custormer secondary data collection via catalogs and magazine subscriptions 
IT 7 Custormer data collection, disclosure and sharing
1 Ww Ww 3 Multidirectional monitoring between organization and employees
2 W w  W 1 Veillance relationships in prvatization of a state-owned enterprise
1 W w w W 1 Healthcare IS enabling multiple watchers and watched
2 W w w 2 IT-enabled systems and techniques of data collection and identification
3 W Ww 8 IT-enhanced capability of making  employees visible to their managers and peers
4 W Ww 1 Predictions in crowd generated data
5 Ww Ww 4 Multi-directional monitoring on online platforms 
6 w W W 1 Impact of customers' culture and state regulation on corporeate information privacy
7 W w W 1 Monitoring of customer data in location-based services and its regulation by the state
8 Ww w W 1 Impacts of law on information collection and sharing of patient data 
9 W w w w W 1 IT enabled method of screening individuals for concealing information
10 Ww w 1 Identity ecosystems
11 W  w 3 IT-enabled capabilities to collect and manage customer data
12 Ww w W 1 Market surveillance systems
13 Ww Ww 1 IT-enabled multidirectional veillance of professional peers and their customers
14 w W 1 Using IT to monitor traders' activities
15 Ww W 1 Video surveillance enabling monitoring of  citizen behavior by the state and by peers
16 Ww Ww 1 Data collection in Iranian Internet social networks 


















Table 4. Actor Involvement in IT and non-IT veillance 
 
3 or more 
actors 
2 or more 
Watchers (W) 
2 or more 
Watched (w) 




Shared patterns   
Non-IT veillance 0 0 0 24 62 
IT veillance 0 0 0 5 36 
 Distinctive patterns 
Non-IT veillance 1 1 0 3 4 
IT veillance 8 22 12 18 30 
Total in non-IT veillance 1 1 0 27 66 
Total in IT veillance 8 22 12 23 66 
Total (all papers) 9 23 12 50 132 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Papers and Cases Discussing Hard, Soft, or Both Veillance Mechanisms  
  
  
Number of occurrences Occurrences 
 per pattern 
% of papers 
Only hard Only soft Both Only hard % Only soft % Both % 
Shared patterns 
Non-IT veillance 25 15 22 62 40.3% 24.2% 35.5% 
IT veillance 24 3 9 36 66.7% 8.3% 25.0% 
Distinctive patterns 
Non-IT veillance 0 1 3 4 0% 25.0% 75.0% 
IT veillance 13 6 11 30 43.3% 20.0% 36.7% 
Total across papers 62 25 45 132    
 
Table 6. Distribution of Veillance Foci across Shared and Distinctive Patterns 
  
Occurrences per  
 foci per pattern 
Occurrences per 
veillance type 
% of occurrences of 
veillance foci per pattern 
  VoB VoS VoC   VoB VoS VoC 
Shared patterns  
Non-IT veillance 39 29 3 71 55% 41% 4% 
IT veillance 31 9 3 43 72% 21% 7% 
Distinctive patterns 
Non-IT veillance 3 3 1 7 43% 43% 14% 
IT veillance 25 7 5 37 68% 19% 13% 
Total in non-IT veillance 42 32 4 78 54% 41% 5% 
Total in IT veillance 56 16 8 80 70% 20% 10% 
Total cases across all papers 98 48 12 158    
 
 




APPENDIX A. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 Table A1. Veillance Typologya and Examples 
    
Veillance 
Types 
Focus of Veillance  
BODY 
Body and behavior 
SOUL 
Social, informal and emotional 




NON-IT • Direct observation 
from managers in 
Taylor-like factories 
with body and 
motion routines 
• Ford Sociological 
Department’s monitoring of 
employee work and life 
experiences, thoughts and 
feelings that guide their work 
(to know about their lives 
outside of work) 
• Team peer monitoring 
• Academic freedom (self-
regulation) 
• Total institutions where all 
parts of life of an individual 
are under controlb 
IT-
MEDIATED 
• Use of CCTV 
cameras 
• Use of ERP systems 
• Use of biometrics 
identification 
• Use of health 
monitoring tools 
(heart rate, activity, 
etc.) 
• Organizational 
collection of price 
matching data 
• Collection of information 
about personality traits, 
preferences, likes, etc. by 
social media companies 
• Company monitoring of the 
blogosphere and employee 
social media accounts 
• Viewing/participating in 
reality TV 
• Digital documentation and 
display of personal life on 
social networks 
• Peer monitoring in virtual 
teams 
• Norms of continuous online 
accessibility and 
responsiveness  
• Co-author scrutiny of 
collaborative work in the 
cloud 
• Pre-employment screening 
and simulations to discover 
the extent to which the 
employee would be hard-
working and committed 
a While the distinction between foci of veillance is analytical (e.g., Clegg and Courpasson 2004; Clegg et al. 2006), it helps us to illustrate 
differences between a variety of veillance practices and their results in the form of Weberian ideal types (Weber 1949). 
 b Clegg et al. (2012) and Goffman (1961) provide more details. 
 
 




APPENDIX B. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CODING PROCESS 
Literature Review Process and Sample Selection 
The literature review was conducted on the top eight MOS10 and top eight IS11 journals. The search was 
conducted on all articles published from each journal’s inception12.  To ensure articles that discussed 
veillance concepts were included even if they did not explicitly recognize such concepts, we used a broad 
set of search keywords related to monitoring practices: surveillance, panopticon, monitoring, privacy and 
audit. The latter three keywords generated many false positives (e.g., articles identified because of the 
audit keyword but discussing accounting concepts or articles identified with the privacy keyword that did 
not include any concepts related to veillance). We also searched for the keyword ‘surveillance’ in the 
Business Source EBSCO database and conducted a citation analysis. Table A1 provides detailed counts of 
the identified papers as well as counts of papers removed during the various screenings discussed below.  
 
Table B1. Number of Articles Identified and Screened in Literature Review 

















Management and Organization Studies (MOS) 
AMJ 67 48 19 5 14 0 14 
AMR 27 15 12 12 0 0 0 
ASQ 32 17 15 2 13 1 12 
JMS 47 33 14 6 8 1 9 
MS 109 89 20 8 12 0 13 
OrgSc 25 16 9 1 8 2 10 
OrgStu 42 29 13 1 12 3 15 
SMJ 27 13 14 4 10 0 10 
 376 260 116 37 79 7 83 
Information Systems (IS) 
EJIS 28 20 8 6 2 0 2 
ISJ 15 10 5 4 1 5 6 
ISR 34 26 8 4 4 0 4 
JAIS 31 23 8 5 3 3 6 
JIT 27 19 8 5 3 0 3 
JMIS 55 36 19 6 13 0 13 
JSIS 21 16 5 2 3 0 3 
MISQ 42 24 18 9 9 3 12 
 253 174 79 38 41 11 49 
SUM 629 434 195  114 18 132 
AMJ: Academy of Management Journal, AMR: Academy of Management Review, ASQ: Administrative Science Quarterly, EJIS: European 
Journal of Information Systems, ISJ: Information Systems Journal, ISR: Information Systems Research, JIT: Journal of Information Technology, 
JMIS: Journal of Management Information Systems, JMS: Journal of Management Studies, JSIS: Journal of Strategic Information Systems, JAIS: 
Journal of the Association of Information Systems, MS: Management Science, MISQ: MIS Quarterly, OrgSc: Organization Science, OrgStu: 
Organization Studies, and SMJ: Strategic Management Journal. 
 
In the initial screening, one co-author reviewed all identified papers’ abstracts and keywords to 
remove articles that were (1) clearly not related to the concepts surrounding veillance, (2) editorials, (3) 
panels and workshops, (4) commentaries, (5) teaching cases, (6) purely scale development papers, (7) calls 
for papers and (8) book reviews.  In case of doubt, the paper was retained in the sample for an in-depth 
screening. Of the initial 629 articles, 195 articles were retained after the first screening. The second 
 
10Financial Times list of top 50 business journals, available at https://www.ft.com/content/3405a512-5cbb-11e1-8f1f-00144feabdc0. 
11 Consistent with prior literature reviews of IS journals (e.g., Bélanger and Carter 2012; Roberts et al. 2012), we used the eight leading IS 
journals in the Association for Information Systems Senior Scholars’ list, available at https://aisnet.org/?SeniorScholarBasket.  
12 We collected and coded all papers until early 2018. We also include in our discussions papers that were published in 2019 and 2020. Overall, 




screening involved a second co-author who reviewed the complete articles that were marked for in-depth 
screening and evaluated these in terms of their relevance for veillance research. Any article that was not 
clearly related to veillance research was then screened by a third co-author to confirm its removal or debate 
its relevance. To illuminate what is made visible and how, in non-IT and IT monitoring, we coded only 
empirical articles while we also considered conceptual papers in our review and discussion. After the 
second screening, 114 papers were retained and marked for in-depth coding. Concurrently with the in-depth 
coding of the screened sample, a citation analysis was conducted to identify key additional articles from the 




Guided by the VW framework, empirical papers were coded as follows. Initially, three co-authors 
separately and iteratively coded four articles and then compared their coding, discussing differences and 
reaching agreement on coding categories. Then each co-author coded a set of articles, which was then 
verified by a different co-author. Any code that was unclear was marked for discussion. In the end, most 
articles were double or triple coded to ensure consistency across coders and that there were no coding 
disagreements left.   
Once all coding was completed, we reflected on the process to ensure there was consistency 
between interpretation of the data and emergent veillance concepts (Klein and Myers 1999). Many 
articles did not explicitly recognize the veillance theme in their work, discussing veillance as a side 
concept or as part of another phenomenon. Examples included how noncompliance with security policies 
leads to the need for veillance (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Vance et al. 2013) or how veillance creates issues 
regarding information privacy (e.g., Allen et al. 2007; Bennett et al. 2008). Importantly, along with 
articles that primarily focused on monitoring, these articles provided an important basis for our analysis, 
helping us to explore the key factors underlying how IT transforms relationships between the watcher and 
the watched. These factors contributed to the iterative development of the key elements of the VW 
framework. The final coding categories and sub-categories are shown in Table A2. 
 
Table B2. Final Coding Categories and Attributes of the VF 







driven by IT or 
not. Can be both. 
Non-IT 
Veillance 
Social operation of making visible. 




Actors refer to 
both the 
watchers and the 
watched. Actors 
can be watchers 
(W), watched 
(w) or both 
(Ww).  
Organizations Subjects discussed or studied are organizations. 
Employees Subjects discussed or studied are employees of organizations. 
Customers Subjects used in study are customers or clients of commercial 
organizations. 
Governments Subjects discussed or studied are states, nations, governments, 




Subjects discussed or studied are other people such as 











Compliance When the goal of veillance is to ensure subjects' compliance 
with rules and/or standards. 
Discovery When a situation requires a search for a person and/or 
specific details via veillance. Different from prevention in that 
discovery is focused on current situation (and prevention is 
about stopping future occurrence of a situation). 
Documentation When veillance is about getting fundamental documentation 




interaction with subjects according to procedures when 
applicable. 




When veillance is strategically conducted to influence 




When veillance is used to protect resources and to prevent 
future occurrence of risky events (e.g., security breaches, 
spread of infectious diseases). 
Profit When veillance is used to turn a profit through a variety of 




When veillance is used to ensure that is being done; typically 
works in conjunction with verification; e.g., verification is 
needed to get access to benefits. 
Self-
improvement  
Veillance of self to understand oneself better and/or to 
improve self. 
Verification Veillance that is used to scrutinize and verify that eligibility 
criteria are met. The subject agrees to be scrutinized to gain 
















Social operation of making visible the informal work 
relationship or private life of the watched. Encompasses 
veillance of body but stresses the priority of knowing informal 









How veillance is 
conducted 
Hard Veillance mechanisms such as coercion (forcing others to be 
visible usually by physical power), marking of the body, 
physical inscription (using the architecture, geometry and 
design to visualize those inscribed into the spatial boundaries), 
inspection and fear inducement (making visible by a source of 
external motivation such as fear expectations). 
Soft Veillance mechanisms such as seduction (making others 
visible by making them desiring to do so by intriguing, 
emotionally or sensually involving them so they are self-
interested and involved in being visible), deception (when 
those made visible are deceived into thinking that there is a 
mutual benefit and self-interest in visibility), reward 
inducement (making visible by a source of external motivation 
such as reward expectations) and internalization (making 
others visible because they freely and willingly assume this is 







APPENDIX C. DETAILED CODING OF PAPERS 







































































































































































































































































































































































Adjerid et al. 2016 MS x x x x W,w w W
Arthurs et al. 2008 AMJ x x x W w
Ball et al. 2000 OrgStu x x x x x W w
Banker et al. 1996 AMJ x x x x W w
Barrett et al. 2012 OrgSc x x x x W,w
Beatty & Zajac 1994 ASQ x x x W w
Belot & Schröder 2016 MS x x x W,w
Bernstein 2012 ASQ x x x x W W x x x x W w
Brocklehurst 2001 OrgStu x x x x x W w x x x x W w
Campbell et al. 2005 MS x x x x W,w W,w
Clegg et al. 2012 OrgStu x x x x w W
Clegg et al. 2002 OrgStu x x x W,w
Collinson 1999 OrgStu x x x x W W
Combs et al. 2007 JMS x x x W,w W,w
Conlon & Parks 1990 AMJ x x x x W w
Culnan & Armstrong 1999 OrgSc x x x x W w
Deary et al. 2002 JMS x x x x W w
Dejong & Elfring 2010 AMJ x x x W,w
Dencker 2009 ASQ x x x x x W w
Desender et al. 2013 SMJ x x x W w
Dharwadkar 2008 OrgSc x x x W w
Ezzamel et al. 1998 ASQ x x x x x W w x x x x x
Fineman 1998 OrgStu x x x w W
Finkelstein et al. 1994 AMJ x x x W w
Gentry & Shen 2013 SMJ x x x x x W,w
Gino et al. 2013 MS x x x w W
Goranova 2010 SMJ x x x W w
Greenwood 2007 OrgStu x x x x x W w




W = Watchers         
w = Watched






W = Watchers         
















































































































































































































































































































































































W = Watchers         
w = Watched






W = Watchers         
w = watched GoalsFOCI
He & Wang 2009 AMJ x x x x x W w
Huddart 1993 MS x x x W w
Iedema et al 2006 OrgStu x x x x x W,w
Iedema & Rhodes 2010 OrgStu x x x x x x W W,w
Jensen 2006 ASQ x x x W,w
Kurland & Egan 1999 OrgSc x x x W w
Lane et al. 1998 SMJ x x x x x W w
Langfred 2004 AMJ x x x x x W,w
Lazega 2000 OrgStu x x x x x x W,w
Levay & Waks 2009 OrgStu x x x x W,w
Li & Sarkar 2013 MS x x x x W w w
Long et al. 2011 AMJ x x x x x x W,w W,w
Loughry & Tosi 2011 OrgSc x x x x W,w
Marquis & Qian 2014 OrgSc x x x x x w W
Marsden & Tung 1999 MS x x x x x W w
Mazmanian et al. 2013 OrgSc x x x x x W W,w
Mehra et al. 2001 ASQ x x x x W,w
Milberg et al. 2000 OrgSc x x x w W W
Natividad 2014 MS x x x x x W,w w
Niehoff & Moorman 1993 AMJ x x x x W w
Ogbonna & Wilkinson 2003 JMS x x x x x W w
Ouchi 1977 ASQ x x x x x W w
Ouchi & Maguire 1975 ASQ x x x x x W w
Perlow 1998 ASQ x x x x x x W w
Pierce & Toffel 2013 OrgSc x x x x Ww
Pierce et al. 2015 MS x x x x x W w
Poppo & Zhou 2014 SMJ x x x W,w
Premeaux & Bedeian 2003 JMS x x x W,w
















































































































































































































































































































































































W = Watchers         
w = Watched






W = Watchers         
w = watched GoalsFOCI
Reuer et al. 2014 SMJ x x x x W w
Riad 2005 OrgStu x x x x W,w W,w
Rizq 2013 OrgStu x x x x x w w W
Rodríguez et al. 2007 JMS x x x x x W w W
Ruolian et al. 2015 OrgSc x x x W,w
Rutherford et al. 2007 JMS x x x x x W w
Sarkar and Sriram 2001 MS x x x x w W
Sasovova et al. 2010 ASQ x x x W,w
Scott et al. 2012 AMJ x x x x W,w
Sewell 1998 ASQ x x x x W W,w
Shaw et al., 2000 SMJ x x x x x W w x x x x x W w
Short &Toffel 2010 ASQ x x x x x w W
Staats et al. 2017 MS x x x x W w
Stanko & Beckman 2015 AMJ x x x x x x x W w x x x x x x x W w
Stern 1981 ASQ x x x x W,w
Sweeting & Wong 1997 JMS x x x x W,w
Tosi et al. 1997 AMJ x x x x W w
Tosi et al. 1989 ASQ x x x x W w
Tosi et al. 2003 JMS x x x x W w
Tuggle et al. 2010 SMJ x x x W w
Vaast 2007 OrgStu x x x x W W,w
Visser et al. 2017 JMS x x x x x x W,w W,w
Weiss 2005 OrgStu x x x x x W w
Welbourne et al. 1995 AMJ x x x x x x x W,w












































































































































































































































































































































































Alvarez 2008 ISJ x x x W w
Ameripour et al. 2010 JIT x x x x x x x x W,w Ww
Anandarajan 2002 JMIS x x x x x W w
Anderson et al. 2017 JMIS x x x x x W,w
Angst et al. 2017 MISQ x x x x x W,w W
Astor et al. 2013 JMIS x x x x W,w
Ayyagari et al. 2011 MISQ x x x x x x W w
Benaroch & Chernobai 2017 MISQ x x x W w
Brynjolfsson et al. 2016 MISQ x x x x x x W W,w
Clemons & Wilson 2015 JMIS x x x x x x W w
Crossler & Posey 2017 JAIS x x x x W w
Culnan 1993 MISQ x x x x W w x x x x W w
D'Arcy et al 2009 ISR x x x x W w x x x x W w
Dellarocas 2005 ISR x x x x W,w W,w
Dinev 2008 JSIS x x x x x w W
Doolin 2004 ISJ x x x x x x x W w
ElSawy 1985 MISQ x x x x x W w w
George 1996 MISQ x x x x W w
Gozman & Currie 2014 JIT x x x W w
Grant & Higgins 1991 ISR x x x x x x W w
Karanansios & Allen 2013 ISJ x x x x x W,w W





W= Watchers                  w= 
watched










Table C2 (Cont.). Leading Eight IS Journals Coding (n = 49) 
 
 





































































































































































































































































































































































Karwatzki et al. 2017 JMIS x x x x x W w
Khansa et al. 2017 JMIS x x x x x W w
Kim et al. 2005 JMIS x x x W,w
Kohli et al. 2004 MISQ x x x x x x x W W,w
Kordzadeh et al. 2017 JAIS x x x x W,w W,w
Leclercq-Vandelannoitte 
et al. 2014 EJIS x x x x x x x x W w
Li et al. 2015 JMIS x x x x x x W,w w W
Li et al. 2017 ISR x x x W w
Li, Sarathy et al. 2014 ISJ x x x x x w W
Lowry et al. 2017 JMIS x x x W w W
Pavlou et al. 2002 JSIS x x x x W,w
Sarker 2005 JAIS x x x W w
Scott & Orlikowski 2014 MISQ x x x x x Ww Ww
Silva & Backhouse 2003 JAIS x x x x W w x x x x W w
Singh et al. 2011 JAIS x x x W w
Spiekermann et al. 2017 JIT x x x x W w
Stahl et al. 2012 ISJ x x x W W,w x x x x W W,w
Tung & Marsden 2000 JMIS x x x x w W
Twyman et al. 2014 JMIS x x x W w w w W
Vance et al. 2013 JMIS x x x x x x x W W,w
Vance et al. 2015 MISQ x x x x x x x W W,w
Vieira da Cunha 2013 MISQ W w x x x x
Wareham et al. 1998 ISJ x x x x x x x W w
Warkentin et al 2017 JAIS x x x x x W w
Williams 1996 JSIS x x x w W
Xu et al. 2009 JMIS x x x x x W w W





W= Watchers                  w= 
watched










APPENDIX D. DETAILS OF THEMATIC ANALYSES AND LOGICS OF ACTION NETS 
Table D1. Illustrative Examples of Veillance Goals in IT and non-IT Veillance 
Goals Sample Areas of Key Goals Illustrative Examples  
Non-IT veillance  
Profit 
• Monitoring of employees by managers to increase performance. 
• Collection and monetization of customer data. 
• Corporate governance monitoring. 
• Peer control of members' contributions. 
Arthurs et al. 2008; Bernstein 
2012; Beatty & Zajac 1994; 
Combs et al. 2007; Culnan 
1993; Desender et al. 2013; 
Ouchi & Maguire 1975; 
Rodríguez et al.  2007 
Compliance 
• Monitoring of employees by managers/peer control to ensure 
compliance with organizational goals and culture. 
• Monitoring of peer organizations. 
• State monitoring of corporate social responsibility. 
• Self-monitoring of work by professionals. 
Bernstein 2012; Clegg et al. 2012; 
Dejong & Elfring 2010; Gino et al. 
2013; Lazega 2000; Levay & Waks 
2009; Ouchi & Maguire 1975; 
Ouchi 1977; Pierce & Toffel 2013 
Influence/  
persuasion 
• Monitoring to attract resources and knowledge from others. 
• Disciplinary mechanisms to influence the employee behavior and 
attitudes. 
Mehra et al.  2001; Ruolian et al. 
2015 Sasovova et al. 2010; Zhang 
& Venkatesh 2013 
Verification 
• Monitoring for verifying job outputs/ state indicators. 
• Verifying eligibility and fairness of monitoring by employees. 
Belot & Schröder 2016; Long et 
al.2011; Marquis & Qian 2014; 
Pierce & Toffel 2013 
Prevention/  
protection 
• Monitoring and reporting of accidents. 
• Self-awareness to reduce risky behavior. 
Collinson 1999; D'Arcy et al 2009 
 IT veillance  
Compliance  
• IS as tools to instil discipline on the behavior of the watched. 
• Monitoring to prevent potentially deviant behavior of employees. 
• Diverse impacts of monitoring on compliance and productivity. 
• Peer and self-monitoring for compliance. 
D'Arcy et al. 2009; Doolin 2004; 
Pierce et al. 2015; Sewell 1998; 
Stahl et al. 2012; Vance et al. 2013; 
Bernstein 2012; Pierce et al. 2015; 
Lowry et al. 2017 
Profit 
• New possibilities of IT enable new economic benefits and cost 
efficiencies. 
• IT veillance conducted for compliance. 
Ayyagari et al. 2011; Pierce et al.  
2015; Sewell & Barker 2006; Astor 
et al. 2013; Karwatzki et al.  2017 
a, b; Kim et al. 2005  
Provision of  
benefits 
• IT monitoring for attracting and (re)allocating important 
resources.   
• Provision of benefits or punishments depend on the compliance 
revealed by IT. 
• Disclosure of customer data satisfies multiple parties. 
Alvarez 2008; Anderson et al.  
2017; Brynjolfsson et al. 2016; 
Kordzadeh and Warren 2017; Li et 
al. 2017; Vance et al. 2015; Visser 
et al. 2017; Xu et al. 2009; 
Warkentin et al. 2017 
Verification 
• IT monitoring is enables scrutiny of information by multiple 
parties (e.g. organizations, customers). 
• Verification influences the behavior of the monitored agents and 
leads to their different reactions. 
Marsden & Tung 1999; Scott & 
Orlikowski 2014; George 1996; 
Niehoff & Moorman 1993; Sarkar 




• Online monitoring for advantageous network positions.    
• State monitoring via obligatory reporting through IS. 
• Customer and expert online reviews influences on organizations. 
Doolin 2004; Rizq 2013;  Scott & 




• Decreasing risks in the areas of information and data management, 
healthcare, economic efficiency, and security. 
Adjerid et al.2016; Angst et al. 
2017; Iedema & Rhodes 2010; 
Staats et al. 2017;  
Discovery • Discovering of specificities of the watched not assumed by the 
watcher.    
Ameripour et al. 2010; Iedema & 
Rhodes 2010; Twyman et al. 2014; 
Documentation 
• Collecting data and profiling employee online and offline 
behavior and/or location. 
• Documenting and mining big data generated by crowds. 
Anandarajan 2002; Brynjolfsson et 
al. 2016; Kohli et al. 2004; 
Marsden & Tung 1999; Natividad 


































































































Shared patterns    
Non-IT veillance 1 7 7 1 8 33 4 4 31 96 
IT veillance 2 10 4 1 5 18 8 4 23 75 
Distinctive patterns   
Non-IT veillance 0 2 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 8 
IT veillance 5 4 7 7 8 12 8 1 14 66 
Total cases across goals 8 23 18 10 23 65 20 9 69 245 
 
Table D3. Distribution of Veillance Goals across Shared and Distinctive Veillance Patterns 
 
 






















































































N 1 1 1
IT 2 4 2 1 9 6
N 5 5 2 29 1 18 60 36
IT 2 9 2 1 2 12 3 3 21 55 24
N 1 1 5 1 3 4 8 23 15
IT 1 1 2 1
N 1 1 2 2
IT 1 1 2 1
N 1 1 1
IT 1 1 2 1
N 1 2 1 2 3 9 7
IT 1 1 1 1 1 5 3
3 17 11 2 13 51 12 8 54 171 98
1 Ww Ww 1 1 1 1 1 5 3
2 W w  W 1 1 2 1
1 W w w W 1 1 1 3 1
2 W w w 1 1 1 1 4 2
3 W Ww 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 6 18 8
4 W Ww 1 1 1 3 1
5 Ww Ww 1 2 3 1 1 8 4
6 w W W 1 1 1
7 W w W 1 1 1
8 Ww w W 1 1 2 1
9 W w w w W 1 1 1
10 Ww w 1 1 1
11 W  w 1 2 2 5 3
12 Ww w W 1 1 1 1 4 1
13 Ww Ww 1 1 2 1
14 w W 1 1 2 1
15 Ww W 1 1 1 3 1
16 Ww Ww 1 1 1 1 4 1
17 w W 1 1 1 1 4 1
5 6 7 8 9 14 8 1 15 73 34
DISTRIBUTION OF GOALS ACROSS SHARED PATTERNS





























































Table D4.  Illustrative Examples of Dynamic and Emerging Foci in IT Veillance 
Study Original focus of veillance Emerging focus of veillance 
(Brocklehurst 
2001) 
VoB: as professionals moved from 
office to homeworkers management used 
monitoring electronic diary system that 
made transparent locations of 
homeworkers by logging e-mail time 
and frequencies. 
VoC: the workers developed self-disciplining 
techniques: imposing time zones for work to avoid 
procrastination, adjusting home space for work, 
notifying secretaries if leaving home during working 
time, caring for impression management and visibility 




VoB: managers used physicians’ 
profiling system to monitor and 
benchmark each physician’s clinical 
activities, costs, and outcomes. 
VoC: customized IS enabling peer- and self-veillance, 
visualizing each physician’s activities and costs 
compared to other peers, resulting in closer congruence 
with management’s goals. 
(Leclercq-
Vandelannoitte 
et al. 2014) 
VoB: management using mobile IS to 
track activities of consultants working 
away from the office. 
VoC: emerging norms of commitment to be constantly 
engaged, available online, and responsive during work 
and non-work time. 
(Mazmanian et 
al. 2013) 
VoB: using email communication 
devices to monitor the flow of ongoing 
communication with peers and clients, 
thus increasing productivity, staying “in 
the information loop”, and choosing 
whether and when to participate. 
VoS: emerging informal culture of continuous 
engagement; and addiction to email mobile devices 
during non-work time. 
VoC: emerging norms of responsiveness and 
accessibility 24/7; using devices as key components of 




VoB: monitoring work activities of 
Navy personnel for securing and 
productivity. 
VoS: emerging need to monitor all personnel nonwork 
and personal online activities to avoid security issued 
and maintain attention on work.  
(Rizq 2013) VoB: practices of mental health 
practitioners monitored for efficiency 
and compliance with required 
undertaking of measurement and 
reporting datasets and software. 
(elimination of) VoS: increased pressure for intensity 
of reporting and available medical categories make 
apparent the dismissing articulation of social, 
emotional and informal contexts of care among 
healthcare professionals. 
(Visser et al. 
2018) 
VoB: healthcare professionals using 
personal online health communities to 
monitor their caring activities for 
patients with specialized diseases. 
VoC: using the IS as a means of displaying own 





Table D5. New Logics of Theorizing about Veillance Systems in the Digital Age 
 
Challenged Assumptions  New Logics Reasoning for IT-enabled 
Transformations  
Implications and Future 
Research  
• Elements of veillance 
system (actors, goals, 
mechanisms, and foci)  
designed for stability and 
known a priori 
• Veillance actors and roles 
defined before the act of 
monitoring  
• Veillance systems relying 
on bounded scope and nature 




FLEXIBILITY OF VEILLANCE ELEMENTS 
• Unbounded, emerging, interactive, and 
dynamically involved actors 
• Flexibility enabled by diverse veillance goals and 
mechanisms that are owned, designed, and 
implemented by the watchers and intermediates  
• Dynamically changing and emergent goals and 
foci of veillance,  
• Novel areas of monitoring in the body, senses, 
culture and aspirations of the watched  
• Inclusion/exclusion of the watchers and 
intermediate actors is performative to the 
conceptualizations of the watched and their real-
time and future behavior modifications 
• The watchers and the watched are emerging and 
flexible net of multiple actors mediated by a 
variety of IT and intermediate actors 
• IT editability allows the veillance system 
and its elements (actors, goals, mechanisms, 
and foci) to be continuously modified during 
the process of veillance, even after data have 
been collected, or when other elements of 
veillance systems change 
• IT distributedness facilitates cumulative 
aggregation of data from multiple databases  
• IT granularity enables tailored changes to 
veillance actors, goals, mechanisms and foci 
• IT interactivity enables multiple 
interpretations and changes to the veillance 
elements based on the dynamic set of actors 
and their evolving goals, available  
mechanisms and desired foci  
• IT reprogrammability enables adjustments 
in veillance goals, mechanisms and foci. 
Design of IT veillance systems: 
What methods and tools of design 
for incompleteness might be 
effective for the design of IT 
veillance systems with flexible 
boundaries and elements?  
Whether and how the primary 
patterns of the watcher-watched 
relationships influence how 
veillance systems evolves? 
How can compatibility of multiple 
designs be approached, i.e. how do 
we theorize and practice inputs 
from multiple designers with own 
visions of the veillance system 
boundaries and characteristics? 
• Predefined roles of the 
watcher and the watched 
• The watchers are individual 
or coherent group of actors 
who are central for 
monitoring 
• The watched are passive 
recipients of monitoring who 
can resist or comply 
• Clear boundaries between 
the watcher and the watched* 
 
 
DIFFUSED ACTOR ROLES 
• Diffused nature of the watchers, e.g. extended 
variety, networked nature incorporating the 
intermediate actors and assemblages of human and 
non-human actants 
• Diffused nature of the watched, e.g. changing 
conceptualizations and blurring roles and their 
active involvement in the veillance process 
• Complex inter-organizational relationships 
between the watchers 
•The boundaries between the watcher and the 
watched are changeable, ambiguous and subject to 
networked relationships 
• IT editability enables evolving set of 
veillance actors and roles, including 
intermediate actors 
• IT distributedness facilitates veillance 
visibility to third-parties and its co-creation 
by multiple actors  
• IT granularity enables the watched and 
non-human actants to be engaged in the 
(co)-construction of veillance mechanisms. 
• IT interactivity enables blurring of the pre-
assigned watcher-watched roles. 
• IT reprogrammability enables inclusion/ 
exclusion of intermediate actors and actants 
Dynamics of IT veillance 
systems: 
What are the dynamics and 
formation in the distributed nature 
of the watchers, i.e. how do some 
watcher(s) engage, orchestrate and 
manage other heterogenous 
watchers? How does monitoring 
assembled from the elements of 
veillance systems owned by other 
actors takes place? How do 
veillance participants design, and 
manage veillance mechanisms and 





• Limited manipulations by 
the watchers and watched 
• Manipulations by the 
watcher to normalize and 
shape subjectivity the 
watched 
• Limited resistance forms 
(e.g. informal practices) by 
the watched to manipulate 








Extended manipulative capabilities for the 
watchers:  
• Veillance mechanisms tailored to particular 
watched  
• New ways of manipulations of the watched (e.g. 
predictive bets, non-human oversight) 
• Possibilities to use veillance systems owned by 
other actors 
Extended manipulative capabilities for the watched  
• Both recipients and active manipulators of their 
visibility 
• Possibility to engage a variety of intermediate 
actants and actors to manipulate veillance  
• Power based on IT expertise in managing their 
visibility 
• IT editability enables the watched to be 
continuously engaged in managing their 
visibility 
• IT distributedness enables employment of 
the veillance system owned by others and 
possibilities for intermediate actors to 
manipulate the action net of IT veillance 
• IT granularity facilitates unique tailoring 
and adjustment of veillance mechanisms 
• IT interactivity enables users to activate 
different IT functions thus enabling 
empowering and beneficial manipulations  
• IT reprogrammability enables replacing 
human oversight with IT and new concealed 
manipulative mechanisms (e.g. hyper-real 
simulation, data veillance, and real-time 
behavior modification)  
Functioning of IT veillance 
systems: How does the interplay of 
various actor manipulations impact 
elements of veillance system? 
How does the interplay of various 
actor manipulations impact actor 
boundaries and roles?  
How do veillance actors in 
different roles manipulate veillance 
systems?  
Power: What is the role of IT 
expertise and mastering for 
manipulation? How can veillance 
system be manipulated without 
ownership? How can participants 
opt out of monitoring? How can 
power be re-conceptualized in IT 
veillance systems?   
• Pre-planned behavior and 
control of the watched are 
central to efficient 
monitoring and organizing  
• Designed monitoring 
apparatus is attuned to a 
particular type of veillance 
system 
• Changing the focus of 
veillance would require re-
designing the whole system 
of monitoring  
• The watched are known 
through the pre-designed 
apparatus of veillance with a 
specific focus  
 
EMERGENT NON-LINEAR ACTOR 
RELATIONSHIPS 
• Effectiveness depends on an ability mobilize 
diverse action net participants to create tailored 
and flexible apparatus (es)  
• Possibility to dynamically change and combine 
monitoring apparatuses to produce diverse 
veillance foci and knowledge of the watched 
• Inclusion/exclusion of certain watchers or 
intermediate actors is performative both to the 
conceptualizations of the watched and their real-
time and future behavior modifications 
• Active role of complex and branched mediating 
agencies (e.g. both human and non-human actants) 
that might influence the monitoring 
• IT expertise in mobilizing and manipulative 
capacity are sources of power 
• IT editability motivates diverse veillance 
actors to continuously update and re-thing 
their roles and participation roles and 
dynamics in IT veillance 
• IT distributedness challenges previously 
established roles by allowing expansion to 
unplanned “others” 
•  IT granularity enables increased emerging 
and unpredictable of knowledge veillance 
actors 
• As IT interactivity contributes to emergent 
roles by though interplay of compatibilities 
(or lack of these) across diverse actors 
• IT reprogrammability enables 
mobilizations of both human and non-human 
actants and their emergent interplays 
Effectiveness, design, and power: 
What particular criteria and sources 
of effectiveness might be applied to 
IT veillance systems with emergent 
and non-linear actor relationships?  
Do any systematic patterns exist in 
the emergent dynamics of actor 
relationships in the action nets of 
IT veillance? How does 
inclusion/exclusion of certain 
actors’ changes conceptualizations 
of the watched and dispositions of 
other actors and roles? 
What are the key sources and 
agents of power in the action net 
model of IT veillance?  
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